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ABSTRACT
Unlike other forms of intellectual property, patents are univer-
sally justified on utilitarian grounds alone. Valuable inventions and
discoveries, bearing the characteristics of public goods, are easily
appropriated by third parties. Because much technological innova-
tion occurs pursuant to significant expenditures—both in terms of
upfront research and subsequent commercialization costs—inventors
must be permitted to extract at least part of the social gain associated
with their technological contributions. Absent some form of propri-
etary control or alternative reward system, economics predicts that
suboptimal capital will be devoted to the innovative process.
This widely accepted principle comes with an important corollary:
namely, that canons of patent law should accurately reflect the
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subject’s utilitarian foundation. The most important principle under
this rubric is denying proprietary rights in “self-realizing” inven-
tions—those for which sufficient incentives to invent and commercial-
ize exist independent of the patent system.
The law’s principal means of excluding such inevitable discoveries
is through the nonobviousness doctrine. Yet that doctrine fails to
achieve this task. Two classes of invention may be deemed “self-
realizing”—inventions that are axiomatic (and useful) to those skilled
in the art and innovations that provide utility to the relevant
inventors because they consume the inventions themselves. While the
nonobviousness doctrine excludes the former class of innovative
activity, it utterly fails to eliminate the latter. This regrettable
phenomenon results in social welfare losses and belies the policy
foundation of the patent system.
This particularly startling disconnect between theory and practice
begs the question of whether we can do better. We conclude that the
courts should turn to an often neglected but fundamental tenet of
patent law: the patentable subject matter inquiry. In doing so, we
identify a variety of “self-realizing” innovative activity but find that
a well-crafted patent system must tolerate the inclusion of certain
“inevitable” inventions. We conclude, however, that one sphere of
innovation that can reliably be regarded as inevitable by a priori
assumption involves nonpublic, or “internal,” business methods.
Given free market competition, companies have ample incentives to
develop internal business processes that reduce costs and/or increase
consumer demand, even if these processes cannot be patented. And
because these inventions are suitable for trade secret protection,
inventors who seek patents on internal business methods presumably
do so to raise rivals’ costs.
Unfortunately, the patentable subject matter inquiry thus far has
been wholly unsatisfactory in denying patent protection to undeserv-
ing processes. In late 2008, the Federal Circuit’s deficient “useful,
concrete and tangible result” test in State Street Bank v. Signature
Financial Group, Inc. was jettisoned in favor of a “machine-or-trans-
formation” test in In re Bilski. Although this new standard may limit
the patentability of certain undeserving processes, it rests on a
strained interpretation of Supreme Court precedent. More funda-
mentally, the logic employed bears scant relation to the utilitarian
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underpinning of the patent system, as enshrined in the Patent Act
and the U.S. Constitution.
This Article urges the Supreme Court to reconcile the patentable
subject matter inquiry with its utilitarian roots, particularly in the
context of business method patents.
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INTRODUCTION
A remarkable asymmetry exists between the economic founda-
tion of patent law and the doctrine that animates this theoretical
underpinning. Almost all commentators and judges agree that
utilitarian considerations enjoy hegemonic status in patent juris-
prudence, such that the purpose of the patent system is to induce
the creation and commercialization of technology that otherwise
could be easily appropriated.1 So defined, only those inventions that
would otherwise not materialize, or would be discovered only after
a longer passage of time, should receive the benefits of patent
protection.2 As a patent monopoly carries with it potentially large
social welfare costs, it can be condoned only when necessary to
incentivize the creation and dissemination of disproportionately
valuable information.3
1. See, e.g., Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (citing Kewanee
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974)) (stating the purposes of the federal
patent system are (1) to foster and reward invention; (2) to promote invention disclosure,
which stimulates further innovation and allows the public to practice the invention once the
patent expires; and (3) to assure that the public can freely use ideas in the public domain);
Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE
L.J. 1, 32 (2004); see also Natasha N. Aljalian, The Role of Patent Scope in Biopharmaceutical
Patents, 11 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 3-4 (2005); Daniel J. Gifford, Antitrust’s Troubled
Relations with Intellectual Property, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1695, 1697 (2003); Peter Lee, The
Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure, 83 WASH. L. REV. 39, 44, 51 (2008); Mark A. Lemley,
The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 993-94
(1997) [hereinafter Lemley, Economics of Improvement]; Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen
Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim Scope: A New Perspective on the Doctrine of
Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947, 1950 (2005); Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty:
Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 683 (2004); Viva
R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of Overlapping Intellectual
Property Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1473, 1481-82 (2004); Ned Snow, A Copyright
Conundrum: Protecting Email Privacy, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 501, 560 (2007); Ryan K. Dickey,
Note, The First-to-Invent Patent Priority System: An Embarrassment to the International
Community, 24 B.U. INT’L L.J. 283, 300-01 (2006); Stephen Lindholm, Note, Marking the
Software Patent Beast, 10 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 82, 83-85 (2005); Daniel J. McFeely,
Comment, An Argument for Restricting the Patent Rights of Those Who Misuse the U.S. Patent
System To Earn Money Through Litigation, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 289, 290, 300 (2008); David S.
Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case for Restricting
Patentable Subject Matter 11-26 (Boston College Law Sch., Research Paper No. 163, 2008).
2. Carrier, supra note 1, at 31-33.
3. Patent law therefore bears witness to a systemic tension between prospective long-run
gains in the form of innovation and undeniable short-run costs created by deadweight loss.
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Nevertheless, it is not at all clear that the actual laws developed
by Congress and the courts accurately reflect the patent system’s
utilitarian underpinning. From an economic perspective, inven-
tions and other valuable discoveries possess the characteristics of
public goods; their consumption is nonexcludable (an inventor
cannot stop someone else who knows of the invention from using it)
and nonrival (another person’s use of the invention does not prevent
the inventor from using the invention).4 Absent proprietary
ownership of such information, inventors will devote suboptimal
resources to the innovative process.5 But what form should such
ownership take? Optimally, property rights should be awarded in a
parsimonious manner, awarding deserving inventors just enough
proprietary control over their discoveries to compensate them for
the risk, capital, and opportunity cost expended ex ante.6
Yet patent rules have not been so applied. Most obviously, the law
largely adopts a “one-size-fits-all” approach, purporting to apply
identical rules to vastly disparate industries and contexts, for which
different incentive structures apply.7 The result has been that
sometimes an inventor is overcompensated for her discovery, and
other times she is undercompensated, depending on the relevant
context.8 This phenomenon is to some extent unavoidable, for a
perfect alignment of incentives via the patent system likely cannot
Optimal rules, from a utilitarian perspective, seek to maximize the spread between these two
factors. See infra Part I.B.
4. See, e.g., Carrier, supra note 1, at 32; Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of
Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845, 850-51 (2006); Julian
David Forman, Comment, A Timing Perspective on the Utility Requirement in Biotechnology
Patent Applications, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 647, 663 (2002).
5. Carrier, supra note 1, at 32, 33 & n.123; Ramsey Hanna, Note, Misusing Antitrust:
The Search for Functional Copyright Misuse Standards, 46 STAN. L. REV. 401, 425-26 (1994)
(discussing “systematic underinvestment” in the context of copyrighted materials).
6. See, e.g., Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement,
105 MICH. L. REV. 475, 479, 498 & n.65 (2006); cf. Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent
Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305, 308, 310 (1992); Hanna, supra note 5, at 425-27
(discussing the need to compensate risk in incremental and discontinuous innovation
processes).
7. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents, Product Exclusivity, and Information
Dissemination: How Law Directs Biopharmaceutical Research and Development, 72 FORDHAM
L. REV. 477, 486 (2003).
8. See James Bradshaw, Comment, Gene Patent Policy: Does Issuing Gene Patents Accord
with the Purposes of the U.S. Patent System?, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 637, 653-54 (2001).
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be attained.9 Society has limited empirical ability to compare spe-
cific rules, applied in practice, to the optimal ones that would be
mandated by theory.10 In general, then, some uncertainty inevitably
exists about the rules properly brought to bear on innovations in the
useful arts and sciences.11
This Article concerns a major issue that is at the cusp of this
broader tension and that relates to the differing incentive struc-
tures for various inventions. It considers how intellectual property
(IP) law does and ought to treat processes that, though immensely
valuable, entirely novel, and far from obvious, are undeserving of
patent protection from a utilitarian perspective. More specifically,
the Article considers what might be termed “self-realizing” inven-
tions —ones for which adequate incentives to invent and commer-
cialize exist entirely independent of the patent system. The
normative case for patenting such innovations is weak, because
society unnecessarily pays for the deadweight loss of inventions that
were, in a sense, “inevitable.”
The question therefore arises: is there a reliable way to disqualify
novel, highly valuable, and nonobvious inventions that would be
invented even if they were not to receive patent protection? In
answering this question, a crucial predicate issue is whether the
kinds of innovations that fit this profile can be categorically
identified ex ante. If so, courts should define those categories of
inventions as nonpatentable subject matter and deny protection
accordingly. If the purpose of the patent system is to provide
otherwise absent incentives to invent and commercialize, then
swathes of inventive activity that do not need these incentives
should fall outside the purview of patent protection. In short,
9. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV.
4, 11 (1984).
10. See David McGowan, Copyright Nonconsequentialism, 69 MO. L. REV. 1, 67-68 (2004)
(summarizing the argument, in the context of copyright law, that scholars do not have the
data necessary to empirically measure the marginal effects of different policies).
11. See, e.g., Matthew Sag & Kurt Rohde, Patent Reform and Differential Impact, 8 MINN.
J. L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 50 (2007) (noting the “empirical uncertainty surrounding optimal patent
scope”); Alan O. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha
“Solution,” 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 47, 58 (2002) (noting that “modern patent systems provide a
crude way of rewarding inventors in the face of great uncertainty about the optimal rewards
in each case”).
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nonobvious, useful, but “self-realizing” processes belong in the
public domain if they are not protected as trade secrets.
This Article identifies various categories of “self-realizing”
innovative activity that fit these criteria and hence might be ex-
cluded from patent protection. One such category involves “eureka”
inventions—those that are discovered in a flash of brilliance rather
than preceded by capital-intensive endeavors. There is some reason
to believe that such ad hoc discoveries, immensely valuable to
society as they might be, would be invented anyway even if they did
not receive patent protection. Another category of self-realizing
discovery involves discoveries that are spurred primarily by social,
rather than pecuniary, incentives. Such inventions are often
discovered in academic circles, where the lure of reputational gain
might obviate the need for patent protection.
Although eureka inventions and innovations pursuant to social
incentives are two prominent categories of self-realizing discoveries,
this Article concludes, for a variety of reasons, that it would be very
difficult as a practical matter to categorically deny patent protection
to such inventions. Instead, this Article targets a more promising
category of self-realizing discovery: inventions that are consumed by
the inventors themselves. Most “self-consumed” inventions would be
crafted regardless of whether the patent system existed. That is
because the innate utility of these inventions drives inventors to
create them in the first place.
To illustrate, the paradigmatic contemporary example of a
nonobvious, self-consumed invention is the business method. A new
and useful method of conducting business, whether patentable or
not, will improve the bottom line of a profit-maximizing company by
decreasing operating and other commercial costs and/or increasing
consumer demand. Even absent the opportunity to patent or license
a novel business method to others, an innovator reaps the benefits
of her achievement through internal consumption. She has a reason
to invent even if she cannot patent her invention. As a result,
granting property rights to the inventor of a self-consumed business
method creates limited benefits in the form of future incentives but
entails unquestionable social losses caused by the inability of others
to practice that business method. This problem has only grown more
2009] SELF-REALIZING INVENTIONS 905
acute as business method patents have proliferated at prodigious
rates in recent years.12
Of course, the law is not entirely blind to the costs of patenting
self-realizing inventions, including business methods. The patent
laws, both as written and as interpreted by the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) and the federal courts, require that a pat-
entable technological advancement be one that would not have been
obvious to one skilled in the relevant art.13 This nonobviousness
requirement—which has been deemed by some as the “ultimate
condition of patentability”14—indirectly excludes many discoveries
that would likely be inevitable, as they would be “obvious” in light
of contemporary technology.
The gatekeeper function performed by the nonobviousness
requirement is both substantive and beneficial.15 But it is also
incomplete. In particular, the nonobviousness doctrine fails to dis-
qualify a large swath of inventions that, although nonobvious, would
be discovered anyway because of overriding incentives outside of
the patent system.
Moreover, the other typical prerequisites of patentability—
novelty, utility, enablement, and best mode—are likely of limited
use in excluding such self-realizing inventions. Utility is typically
an edentulous requirement, met with ease in most situations not
12. See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 397 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); see also John W. Bagby, Business Method Patent Proliferation: Convergence of
Transactional Analytics and Technical Scientifics, 56 BUS. LAW. 423, 445 (2000); Michael
Moulton, Note, Effecting the Impossible: An Argument Against Tax Strategy Patents, 81 S.
CAL. L. REV. 631, 633 (2008) (noting the “surge” in business method patent applications in
recent years); Gerald H. Kiel & Harry K. Ahn, “Business Methods” are Broadly Defined: Patent
Protection Is Available in Variety of Areas Including Marketing, Sales and Finance, N.Y.L.J.,
Feb. 3, 2003, at S9 (opining that two recent Federal Circuit decisions, State Street Bank and
AT&T, discussed infra, “opened a floodgate for companies to seek patent protection for new
business methods”).
13. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
14. Jeanne C. Fromer, The Layers of Obviousness in Patent Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
75, 75 (2008) (quoting NONOBVIOUSNESS—THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY (John
F. Witherspoon ed., 1980) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
15. See Philippe Ducor, Recombinant Products and Nonobviousness: A Typology, 13 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 11 (1997) (explaining that the nonobviousness
condition is the most difficult requirement of patentability); John K. Flanagan, Gene Therapy
and Patents, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 739, 750 (1998) (same). For an account of the
social good served by the nonobviousness condition, see STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 152 (2004).
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involving pharmacological and other biotechnological compounds.16
To be useful, an invention need only have some minimally operable
use toward a specific purpose.17 Novelty will pose no bar to a
theretofore unanticipated discovery. And for any kind of valuable
discovery, the enablement and best mode requirements are easily
met.18
This Article proposes a new approach. In particular, this Article
suggests that the patentable subject matter inquiry should be
reformed to reflect patent law’s utilitarian underpinning and
thereby exclude from patentability certain self-realizing inventions.
Until very recently, courts worked in diametric opposition to this
goal.19 Although the law historically excluded myriad types of
inventions from the sphere of patentability,20 this broad exclusion
proved far from durable.21 Over the past several decades, courts
have radically expanded the field of patentable subject matter.22 In
particular, computer software was rendered generally patentable
following a sequence of facilitative cases.23 In 1999, the Federal
16. See 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 4.01 (2009); see also Lucas Osborn,
Tax Strategy Patents: Why the Tax Community Should Not Exclude the Patent System, 18 ALB.
L.J. SCI. & TECH. 325, 336 (2008).
17. See Judith B. Jennison, Introduction to Intellectual Property for the Licensing
Practitioner, 763 PLI/PAT 353, 358 (2003).
18. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006); see also Joseph E. Root, Ducking the Asteroid: Practical
Steps Toward Best Mode Compliance, 36 AIPLA Q.J. 455, 462 (2008) (noting that only eleven
patents have ever been invalidated by the Federal Circuit for best mode violations).
19. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. NO. 1979,
at 5 (1952)) (holding that “anything under the sun that is made by man” falls within the
Patent Act).
20. See, e.g., Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568) (noting
that “mischievous or immoral” inventions did not meet patent law’s utility requirement).
21. See, e.g., Dana Remus Irwin, Paradise Lost in the Patent Law? Changing Visions of
Technology in the Subject Matter Inquiry, 60 FLA. L. REV. 775, 802-03, 807-10 (2008); Lee,
supra note 1, at 89; Anu R. Sawkar, Note, Are Storylines Patentable? Testing the Boundaries
of Patentable Subject Matter, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 3001, 3044 (2008).
22. See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public
Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 40 (2003); David W. Opderbeck, Patent Damages
Reform and the Shape of Patent Law, 89 B.U. L. REV. 127, 128 (2009); Peter M. Kohlhepp,
Note, When the Invention is an Inventor: Revitalizing Patentable Subject Matter To Exclude
Unpredictable Processes, 93 MINN. L. REV. 779, 787-91 (2008).
23. The most important case in this sequence was decided by the Supreme Court in 1981.
See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-93 (1981) (holding that computer programs are
patentable subject matter); see also Robert E. Thomas, Debugging Software Patents:
Increasing Innovation and Reducing Uncertainty in the Judicial Reform of Software Patent
Law, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 191, 237 (2009).
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Circuit held that illegal or immoral inventions could be patented.24
And although the prohibition on the patenting of abstract ideas,
rules of nature, and mathematical algorithms remains intact,25 the
ever-expanding field of patentable invention is perhaps best
summed up by the Supreme Court’s pronouncement that the Patent
Act encompasses “anything under the sun that is made by man.”26
A particularly controversial issue has centered on the patent-
ability of business methods. The Federal Circuit dramatically
expanded the scope of patentable business methods in its seminal
State Street Bank decision, finding that a process that yields a
“useful, concrete and tangible result” satisfies § 101 of the Patent
Act.27 After State Street Bank, only those methods that were intrin-
sically and inescapably abstract became unpatentable.28 Thus, a
patent agent suitably skilled in crafting claims could draft an
otherwise unpatentable process in a way that gave it patent pro-
tection. Not surprisingly, the consequence was an influx of patent
applications for business methods and computer software29—a
phenomenon that has been immensely controversial.30
24. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
25. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (“Phenomena of nature, though just
discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they
are the basic tools of scientific and technological work.”); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo
Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (“The qualities of these bacteria, like the heat of the
sun, electricity, or the qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men.
They are manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.”).
26. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
27. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
28. Id. at 1373 (quoting Diamond, 450 U.S. at 185).
29. See, e.g., Bradford L. Smith & Susan O. Mann, Innovation and Intellectual Property
Protection in the Software Industry: An Emerging Role for Patent?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 241, 258
n.72 (2004); Stephanie L. Varela, Damned If You Do, Doomed If You Don’t: Patenting Legal
Methods and Its Effect on Lawyers’ Professional Responsibilities, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1145, 1152
n.37 (2008).
30. See, e.g., DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 775 (3d ed. 2004);
Carlos M. Correa, Internationalization of the Patent System and New Technologies, 20 WIS.
INT’L L.J. 523, 533 (2002); Stefania Fusco, Is the Use of Patents Promoting the Creation of New
Types of Securities?, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 243, 268 (2009); Andrew
A. Schwartz, The Patent Office Meets the Poison Pill: Why Legal Methods Cannot Be Patented,
20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 333, 334-35 (2007); Tim Wu, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and
Decentralized Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 123, 141 (2006).
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In late 2008, the Federal Circuit enunciated a new standard
for the patentability of business methods in In re Bilski.31 Bilski
reversed State Street Bank and allowed the patenting of methods
that are tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or that trans-
form an article into a different state or thing.32 As this Article
explores, the newly enunciated Bilski test, although excluding
certain undeserving processes, rests on a highly suspect jurispru-
dential foundation. Moreover, Bilski, like the patentable subject
matter cases that precede it,33 regrettably falls prey to a judicial
aversion to abstraction and ignores the incentive to invent and
commercialize principles that motivate patent law.34
This Article seeks to shift the patentable subject matter inquiry
back toward its utilitarian roots. This is not a trivial task, as a
workable doctrine must enable courts to engage in some meaningful
categorical analysis. Indeed, questions abound. For example, how
does one define a broad class of inventions as “self-realizing”? What
kind of propensity for over- or underinclusion would be acceptable?
Can one ever truly be confident concluding in an ex post setting that
a particular invention, or class of invention, would have emerged
in the absence of patent protection? Hindsight bias is apt to be
problematic.35 Moreover, the plethora of incentives to invent that
emanate from sources other than the patent system will surely
affect individual prospective inventors in unique ways. The poten-
tial for reputational gain, or the innate thrill of discovery, may
prove compelling to one inventor yet insufficient to another.36
31. 545 F.3d 943, 961-62 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll,
129 S. Ct. 2735.
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., supra notes 23-27.
34. See infra Part II.A.
35. See, e.g., Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious II: Experimental Study on the
Hindsight Bias Issue Before the Supreme Court in KSR v. Teleflex, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 8
(2007); Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration That the
Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 1403 (2006);
Colleen M. Seifert, Now Why Didn’t I Think of That? The Cognitive Processes That Create the
Obvious, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 489, 504-07 (2008); see also Lorie M. Graham & Stephen
M. McJohn, Cognition, Law, Stories, 10 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 255, 256-57 (2009); Gregory
N. Mandel, Another Missed Opportunity: The Supreme Court’s Failure To Define
Nonobviousness or Combat Hindsight Bias in KSR. v. Teleflex, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 323,
324 (2008) [hereinafter Mandel, Another Missed Opportunity].
36. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A
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Technically, the former should be denied the patent protection
that would be awarded the latter. Yet idiosyncratic and heavily spe-
cific inquiries of this kind carry inordinate risks. Similarly, broad or
sweeping conclusions concerning certain fields of innovation are
surely dangerous and may carry an unacceptably high risk of false
positives (Type I errors).37 Even if the courts can distinguish self-
realizing inventions from other valuable innovation with flawless
precision—surely a quixotic assumption—an inventor’s mere per-
ception that she may be improperly denied her reward may impede
innovation.
These are weighty concerns that have significant repercussions
for the construction of optimal rules. Indeed, their import requires
that many inevitable inventions remain within the purview of the
patent system. Such false negatives (Type II errors)38 are the cost of
implementing an optimal patent law in the presence of significant
informational constraints.
Despite these concerns, we conclude that certain business
methods are the kind of self-realizing inventions that can safely be
withdrawn from the field of patentable subject matter. In particular,
because business methods are consumed by their inventors them-
selves, their operation will often remain internal to the business and
hidden from competitors. Such methods can be protected adequately
by trade secret law. And as mentioned, even if such inventions
received no proprietary protection, an inventor would still have an
incentive to create a new and useful business method because it
would presumably improve his bottom line. Moreover, unlike non-
Quiet Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 64 (2003) (“Even in the absence of patent
protection, the availability of lead-time rents or reputation rents will ensure an adequate
incentive for the creation of less costly (or ‘routine’) innovations.”).
37. See, e.g., A. Neil Campbell & J. William Rowley, The Internationalization of Unilateral
Conduct Laws—Conflict, Comity, Cooperation, and/or Convergence?, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 267,
320 (2008); Michael A. Carrier, Of Trinko, Tea Leaves, and Intellectual Property, 31 J. CORP.
L. 357, 373 (2006); Marina Lao, Aspen Skiing and Trinko: Antitrust Intent and “Sacrifice,” 73
ANTITRUST L.J. 171, 178 (2005); John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Monopolization,
Innovation, and Consumer Welfare, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 367, 387 (2001); Jonathan Remy
Nash, Standing and the Precautionary Principle, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 494, 502 n.36 (2008)
(citing Jonathan B. Wiener, Precaution in a Multirisk World, in HUMAN AND ECOLOGICAL RISK
ASSESSMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 224 (Dennis D. Paustenbach ed., 2002)); Jessie Cheng,
Note, An Antitrust Analysis of Product Hopping in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 108 COLUM.
L. REV. 1471, 1505 (2008).
38. See, e.g., Campbell & Rowley, supra note 37, at 320.
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self-consumed products, internal business methods require no ex
post capital for commercialization, so proprietary control is not
needed to recoup those costs. And inventors generally patent in-
ternal business methods to enjoin the operation of rivals.39 This
conduct creates unnecessary social costs given that the business
method would likely have been invented for the benefit of the
business even in the absence of patent protection.
For these and other reasons, this Article contends that the
Supreme Court, which granted certiorari and recently heard oral
argument in Bilski, should reconcile the patentable subject matter
inquiry with patent law’s utilitarian roots by denying patentability
to internal business methods (like the one at issue in that case). In
particular, this Article explains how this approach is consistent
with Supreme Court precedent and honors “the constitutional and
statutory goal of promoting ‘the Progress of Science and the useful
Arts.’”40
I. PATENT LAW AS A SYSTEM OF INCENTIVES
A. The Utilitarian Foundation of Patent Law
A vociferous debate continues to rage regarding the IP system as
a whole. Should an artist’s right to her work be founded in natural
rights, allowing her to control her work’s use and dissemination in
a manner of her choice? Or should the existence of this right depend
on a utilitarian calculus that weighs society’s larger interests in the
work?41 Some commentators even argue that the unique attributes
39. For an example of such a tactic, see Craig P. Opperman, Business Method Patents
(Enter the Debate or Seize the Opportunity?), 637 PLI/PAT 1027, 1032 (2001).
40. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).
41. See, e.g., Robert C. Bird & Lucille M. Ponte, Protecting Moral Rights in the United
States and the United Kingdom: Challenges and Opportunities Under the U.K.’s New
Performances Regulations, 24 B.U. INT’L L.J. 213, 213-15 (2006); Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and
Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409, 444-45 (2002); Lucille M. Ponte, Preserving
Creativity from Endless Digital Exploitation: Has the Time Come for the New Concept of
Copyright Dilution?, 15 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 34, 45 n.63, 50-51 (2009); Rikki Sapolich,
When Less Isn’t More: Illustrating the Appeal of a Moral Rights Model of Copyright Through
a Study of Minimalist Art, 47 IDEA 453, 455 (2007); Joan Pattarozzi, Note, Can the
Australian Model Be Applied to U.S. Moral Rights Legislation?, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 423, 423-24 (2007); Patrick G. Zabatta, Note, Moral Rights and Musical Works: Are
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of information require such creations to be available to all for use in
cumulative or “follow-on” innovation and costless consumption.42
Even if one rejects the position that information “wants” to be,
and hence should be, free, there remains serious debate over
whether certain IP rights should be based on utilitarian principles,
particularly in the realm of copyright law.43 Indeed, it is clear that
a plethora of rules within copyright law offer protection in instances
in which the rules cannot be reconciled with economic theory. For
example, utilitarianism cannot easily explain why doctoral students
receive copyrights in their dissertations, even though the students
are required to produce that work anyway to meet university re-
quirements. Similarly, utilitarianism does not explain why artists
enjoy copyright protection for their natural lives plus seventy
years.44 For one, this rule creates asymmetric incentives by re-
warding younger artists more than their older colleagues.45 More
fundamentally, it strains credibility to imagine that a person would
be incentivized in a serious incremental way by granting her a term
of proprietary control over her work that far surpasses her natural
life.46
Composers Getting Berned?, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1095, 1104 (1992).
42. See STEWART BRAND,THE MEDIA LAB: INVENTING THE FUTURE AT MIT 202 (1987); Jack
M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV.
927, 936-37 (2006); R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants To Be Free: Intellectual Property and
the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 998-99 (2003) (arguing that powerful IP
rights ultimately increase the amount of information in the public domain).
43. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of
Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989) (positing a system of copyright that is driven
by economic efficiency).
44. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 284 (1970); Michael H.
Davis, Extending Copyright and the Constitution: “Have I Stayed Too Long?,” 52 FLA. L. REV.
989, 996-1000, 1022 (2000); Christina N. Gifford, The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 363, 397-400 (2000); Marci A. Hamilton, Copyright Duration
Extension and the Dark Heart of Copyright, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 655, 656 (1996);
Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057, 1066-67 (2001);
Robert Patrick Merges & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Proper Scope of the Copyright and
Patent Power, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 45, 57-59 (2000).
45. See Avishalom Tor & Dotan Oliar, Incentives To Create Under a “Lifetime-Plus-Years”
Copyright Duration: Lessons from a Behavioral Economic Analysis for Eldred v. Ashcroft, 36
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 437, 453 (2002). For an interesting discussion of the possible benefits of “a
system of indefinite copyright renewals,” however, see William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyrights, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 473-75 (2003).
46. See, e.g., BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 114 (1967) (“I doubt
912 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:897
Indeed, some have argued that there is room for a moral rights
theory within U.S. copyright law.47 Even outside the copyright
realm, which is surely the most controversial area given its
interplay with issues of free speech and liberal ideology,48 consider-
able controversy surrounds the proper contours of trade secret and
trademark law.49
Unlike these other areas of IP, such fraught issues tend not to
dominate patent law, for which the utilitarian case has proved
compelling.50 Technological advancement, conducted in large part
by private industry, offers a far more convincing basis for creating
property rights in innovation. Although broad swathes of artistic
activity exist that one might reliably presume to be largely unaf-
fected by the presence of copyright laws—after all, some artists
derive enough utility from the act of creation itself 51—the same
cannot be said for the considerable majority of innovative activity
subject to patent creation. The pharmaceutical industry, for ex-
ample, essentially would cease to exist absent IP protection.52 The
a convincing case has been made for extending copyright in works of natural authors a
generation’s worth beyond the present statutory term.”).
47. See, e.g., Ilhyung Lee, Toward an American Moral Rights in Copyright, 58 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 795, 798-99 (2001).
48. See, e.g., Alan E. Garfield, The Case for First Amendment Limits on Copyright Law,
35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1169, 1170-71 (2007); Steven J. Horowitz, A Free Speech Theory of
Copyright, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2; Adrian Liu, Copyright as Quasi-Public Property:
Reinterpreting the Conflict Between Copyright and the First Amendment, 18 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 383, 390-96 (2008); Lee Ann W. Lockridge, The Myth of Copyright’s
Fair Use Doctrine as a Protector of Free Speech, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
31, 38, 48-54 (2007); William McGinty, First Amendment Rights to Protected Expression: What
Are the Traditional Contours of Copyright Law?, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1099, 1112 (2008).
49. For a particularly important discussion of the economic role of trade secret law, see
Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights 2-3 (Stanford
Law & Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 358, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1155167 [hereinafter Lemley, Surprising Virtues].
50. See supra note 1; see also Burton T. Ong, Patenting The Biological Bounty: Re-
Examining the Status of Organic Inventions as Patentable Subject Matter, 8 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 1, 40 (2004).
51. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112
YALE L.J. 369, 423-43 (2002); Adam D. Moore, A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property, 21
HAMLINE L. REV. 65, 73 (1997); Adam D. Moore, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Social
Progress: The Case Against Incentive Based Arguments, 26 HAMLINE L. REV. 601, 619 (2003);
Mark S. Nadel, How Current Copyright Law Discourages Creative Output: The Overlooked
Impact of Marketing, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 785, 811-12 (2004).
52. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE: HOW EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT REGULATION
STIFLES PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 24, 58 (2006); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER,
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average cost of researching, developing, and commercializing a
drug has been estimated to be up to, and even exceeding, one billion
dollars.53 Such levels of capital will hardly be regularly forthcoming
on an altruistic basis. More generally, all forms of technological
advancement that require significant capital to be devoted ex ante
are likely in need of patentability to ensure their production.54
Moreover, the argument for moral rights over scientific advance-
ment in the commercial setting is surely more attenuated than with
respect to works of art.55 In any event, academic commentators
have resoundingly embraced the position that patent law exists to
promote purely utilitarian concerns.56 More importantly, the U.S.
Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed the same view on
several occasions.57
INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING
INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 39-41 (2004); James Bessen & Michael
J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from Empirical Research on Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 1, 8 (2005).
53. See Steve Hickman, Reinventing Invention: Why Changing How We Invent Will
Change What We Patent and What To Do About It, 91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 108,
125 (2009); Bruce Patsner, Problems Associated with Direct-to-Consumer Advertising (DTCA)
of Restricted, Implantable Medical Devices: Should the Current Regulatory Approach Be
Changed?, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1, 19 (2009); Victor E. Schwartz et al., Marketing
Pharmaceutical Products in the Twenty-First Century: An Analysis of the Continued Viability
of Traditional Principles of Law in the Age of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising, 32 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 333, 343 n.42 (2009); Adam R. Young, Note, Generic Pharmaceutical Regulation
in the United States with Comparison to Europe: Innovation and Competition, 8 WASH. U.
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 165, 175 (2009).
54. See, e.g., Hickman, supra note 53.
55. This does not mean, of course, that proprietary rights play no role in motivating the
creation of art. The availability of copyright protection might spur the creation of some artistic
works, particularly those made in a commercial setting. Moreover, copyright and patent law
sometimes overlap, as in the field of computer software. Nevertheless, on the whole, it seems
fair to characterize the field of patentable subject matter as more industrial, more capital-
intensive, and less individualistic than the artistic accomplishments that are primarily
covered by copyright. 
56. See supra note 1.
57. See J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 131 (2001);
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980) (referring to the constitutional command
that Congress promote the progress of science and the useful arts and stating that “[t]he
patent laws promote this progress by offering inventors exclusive rights for a limited period
as an incentive for their inventiveness and research efforts” (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974))); Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 480 (observing that “[t]he
productive effort thereby fostered [by the Patent Act] will have a positive effect on society
through the introduction of new products and processes of manufacture into the economy, and
the emanations by way of increased employment and better lives for our citizens”); see also
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But what are those utilitarian concerns and how does the law
actually implement them? The economic foundation of patent law
seeks to maximize long-run social welfare by inducing an optimal
amount of innovation.58 “Optimal” in this sense is not synonymous
with “maximum.”59 Each increment in scarce resources that is de-
voted to the innovation process is one less resource that can be
employed for other uses.60 Conceivably then, the law should cause
inventors’ incentives to mirror those of society—in other words, the
law should cause prospective patentees to internalize the full social
costs and benefits of their actions.61 This is presently achieved by
granting inventors property rights in their technological discoveries,
thereby allowing them to appropriate at least part of the social
value that their inventions create.
But why are property rights required at all? The answer lies in a
market failure that affects the incentive to invent. The essential
value of an invention lies in the information it contains—how the
particular invention works, how it can be made and commercialized,
and so on. Once this information is disclosed, that information be-
comes a public good, which in economic terms means that it is
nonexcludable and nonrivalrous.62 Being nonexcludable means just
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1966) (rejecting a “natural-rights theory in
intellectual property rights” and recognizing “the social and economic rationale of the patent
system”).
58. See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 12-15, 137-38 (2d ed. 2000).
59. See, e.g., Barbara van Schewick, Towards an Economic Framework for Network
Neutrality Regulation, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 329, 383 (2007).
60. Id. Also, increasing IP protection will not necessarily maximize the rate of innovation.
See Daryl Lim, Copyright Under Siege: An Economic Analysis of the Essential Facilities
Doctrine and the Compulsory Licensing of Copyrighted Works, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 481,
503-04 (2007).
61. Of course, this is likely impossible to achieve in practice. Some spillover or externality
will invariably exist such that an inventor will not be able to internalize the full social value
of his invention. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, The Uneasy Case for Patent Races over
Auctions, 60 STAN. L. REV. 803, 812-13 (2007). Even if this were possible, however, it would
not be desirable to allow inventors to appropriate the full social value of their inventions. See
Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing Innovation
Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 985, 987, 989 (1999).
62. See David W. Barnes, Trademark Externalities, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 3-4 (2007);
Seth Robert Belzley, Grokster and Efficiency in Music, 10 VA. J.L. & TECH. 10, 15 (2005);
Brett Frischmann & Dan Moylan, The Evolving Common Law Doctrine of Copyright Misuse:
A Unified Theory and Its Application to Software, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 865, 908 (2000).
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that—one person cannot exclude another person from using the
good.63 If a noninventor discovers how an invention works, perhaps
by discovering it on his own, reverse-engineering the product or
being told how it operates, then the original inventor cannot exclude
the noninventor from that knowledge. Once the cat is out of the bag,
it cannot be put back in.
Being nonrivalrous means that one person’s use of this informa-
tion does not reduce the ability of another person to use the
information.64 The mere fact that a noninventor knows how an
invention works does not, by itself, affect the inventor’s knowledge
of the invention. More than one person can possess the same
information at any given time without diminishing the information
itself.
Economic theory (and common sense) suggests that it is a good
thing when an invention is nonrivalrous. Unlike with traditional
goods, in which one person’s use and enjoyment comes at the
expense of another’s, information goods are free for all to consume
once they become publicly available.65 Nevertheless, and as noted by
Thomas Barnett, although information might want to be free,
inventors want to get paid.66 Thus, although possession of infor-
mation is nonrivalrous, use of that information might very well
be rivalrous.67 If one discovers a new way to build a widget, and
another becomes privy to that information, the former’s knowledge
of that information does not reduce the latter’s knowledge store.
However, if both parties use that information to build competing
widgets, then the latter’s knowledge might very well cause the
former financial pain (or even drive her out of the widget-making
business). Because of this phenomenon, absent some form of prop-
erty right in her invention, an inventor will likely be seriously
undercompensated relative to the social value she creates.68 Worse
63. See Note, Designing the Public Domain, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1492 (2009).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See Thomas O. Barnett, Interoperability Between Antitrust and Intellectual Property,
14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 859, 865 (2007).
67. See Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in
Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1744 (2007).
68. Some undercompensation is both inevitable and desirable, because it is likely
impossible to create a system of property rights such that all externalities are prevented. See,
e.g., van Schewick, supra note 59, at 383. Even if such a system were possible, the transaction
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still, her inability to profit from her invention might discourage her
from working toward discovering the invention in the first place.
Patent law therefore bestows property rights on inventors of worthy
technologies, thus artificially rendering such discoveries excludable
and allowing a market to develop for the technology at issue.69
This process of propertizing information is further justified on
another basis: namely, the incentive to commercialize.70 This is
quite apart from the danger that third parties will appropriate an
inventor’s technology without payment. It has been well-demon-
strated, most capably by Scott Kieff, that patent protection is
critical to move inventions beyond their conceptual discovery to an
actual marketable product.71 Without an ability to exclude, one who
discovers a valuable technology and attempts to bring that technol-
ogy to market will be vulnerable to free riding by others.72 The latter
group will happily sit on the sidelines while the inventor engages
in commercial testing, manufacturing set-up, advertising, and dis-
tribution, only to join the fray as soon as the product is proven
commercially viable.73 Without a legal right to prevent such free
riding, an inventor may have scant incentive to bring his discovery
to market, with the undesirable result that consumers may be
denied valuable technology.74
B. Innovation, the Cost of Monopoly, and the Failure of
Nonobviousness
The preceding discussion described how patent law operates as a
system of incentives, designed to induce the creation and dissemina-
tion of otherwise easily appropriated technology. But the patent
costs involved would be prohibitive. Id.
69. See, e.g., N.V. Philips’ Gloeilampenfabrieken v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 316 F.2d 401,
409 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (“If there were no patent system at all, anyone would be free to use any
invention. A patent, however, gives one person the right to exclude all others. This monopoly
is the property right in the patent.”).
70. See F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions,
85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 710 (2001) [hereinafter Kieff, Property Rights].
71. Id.
72. Id. at 708-09.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 710.
2009] SELF-REALIZING INVENTIONS 917
regime also creates serious social costs.75 An inventor awarded a
patent, in effect, is granted a monopoly over her invention, with the
result that consumers cannot freely avail themselves of its
nonrivalrous characteristics.76 If the technology at issue is suffi-
ciently valuable—such as if the patented invention is highly useful
and has few if any substitutes—the monopoly that is granted be-
comes an economic monopoly.77 As a result, the inventor will set
the price at the point where marginal cost equals marginal rev-
enue and charge a monopoly price, which exceeds what she would
charge in a competitive market.78 This process results in what
economists refer to as “deadweight loss.”79 As price increases beyond
the competitive level, it will exceed the reservation prices for some
consumers who would have purchased the technology in a competi-
tive market.80 Consequently, a monopoly pricing causes not only a
wealth transfer but allocative inefficiency caused by foregone
transactions.81
In light of these monopoly costs and given patent law’s utilitarian
foundation—a foundation we have shown is ubiquitously accepted
—the use of patents is desirable only when the incentive benefits
they create exceed the allocative inefficiency they cause through
distortions of the pricing mechanism. Indeed, the quintessential
feature of an “incentive to invent” system of property rights should
be the denial of patent rights in “self-realizing” inventions—those
discoveries that would materialize in a timely fashion even if they
were denied patent protection. Granting exclusive rights in such
inventions would not incentivize their creation (because they would
75. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Analyze This: A Law and Economics Agenda for the Patent
System, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2081, 2088 (2000); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property,
and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1059-60 (2005); Gregory Mandel, The Non-Obvious
Problem: How the Indeterminate Nonobviousness Standard Produces Excessive Patent Grants,
42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 57, 62 (2008).
76. See CHISUM, supra note 16, § 3.01 (2008) (“The social cost is higher prices for and
underutilization of the patented process or product during the period of the monopoly.”).
77. See Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 43-44 (2006) (recognizing that
a patent does not necessarily convey economic market power).
78. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 273-75 (6th ed. 2003).
79. See id. at 278-79.
80. Id. at 278.
81. Id. at 278-79.
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be created anyway) but would still carry the full panoply of social
harms associated with monopoly.
Patent law is not completely oblivious to this concern. The novelty
requirement ensures that proprietary rights are not created in
preexisting knowledge, which if allowed would perversely result in
closed access to all information, wholly unacceptable bargaining and
transaction costs, and preclusive levels of royalty stacking.82 The
utility prerequisite mandates that inventors show that their dis-
coveries possess at least some potential for practical application.83
And the nonobviousness requirement excludes from patent protec-
tion those technological contributions that would have been evident
to one skilled in the relevant art.84 Presumably, obvious, useful
inventions of the type excluded would come into being irrespective
of the IP system’s existence.
Nonetheless, these prerequisites to patentability are coarse tools
that fail to filter out many self-realizing discoveries. In other words,
the current system allows many inventions to be patented even
when those inventions would have been created in the absence of
any patent protection. As we shall see, though there might be good
reason for allowing some of these inventions to be patentable, the
system fails to exclude entire categories of self-realizing inventions
that, from a utilitarian perspective, should not receive patent pro-
tection.
The system’s failure to adequately address this issue emanates
from its neglect of a basic and crucial question: what kinds of
inventions can we confidently conclude would be “self-realizing,” as
viewed from an ex post vantage point? The answer to this question
depends on two further issues. First, how far does the relevant
invention jump ahead of the prior art? Second, what incentives
outside of patent law spur inventors to make that jump?
82. See Dewey & Ally Chem. Co. v. Mimex Co., 124 F.2d 986, 990 (2d Cir. 1942) (noting
that “[t]he patent law is aimed at ... more ... than the ordinary rub of competition
automatically brings out from competent workmen in the art”).
83. See Michael S. Mireles, An Examination of Patents, Licensing, Research Tools and the
Tragedy of the Anticommons in Biotechnology Innovation, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 141, 195
(2004).
84. The nonobviousness condition is not trivial; indeed, meeting this requirement is
widely recognized as the most serious impediment to patenting one’s invention. See, e.g.,
Mandel, Another Missed Opportunity, supra note 35, at 324-25.
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The essential problem is that the patent system only addresses
the first question, primarily through the nonobviousness doctrine,
and utterly fails to consider the second. Clearly an “invention” that
involves a de minimis advancement of well-understood technology
is apt to be self-realizing. If obvious (and useful), it is merely a
matter of time before it is implemented or discovered. Hence, the
nonobviousness condition serves a crucial gatekeeping function,
stripping patentability from this class of trivial “self-realizing”
inventions.85
But what of the latter point? What if the technological jump is
significant (and therefore not obvious), and yet there are strong
incentives independent of patent law that would push the inventor
to make that jump regardless of the availability of patent protection
(and hence make the invention inevitable)? This Article argues that
patent law is wholly inadequate in addressing this issue. As we
shall see, the patent system, as currently construed, misses half the
game; it addresses some self-realizing inventions through the
nonobviousness inquiry but completely neglects others that are
inevitable by virtue of independent incentives. Although there is
some basis for defending this dichotomy, we conclude that there are
certain forms of innovative activity that can and should be excluded.
In doing so, we find there is a crucial distinction between inventions
that are self-realizing on account of the value of internal consump-
tion, which constitutes a reliable heuristic, and those that are the
product of broader social incentives, which acts as a less reliable
proxy that is more idiosyncratic in application.
Before proceeding to this analysis, however, we first address an
important predicate question: how “inevitable” must an invention
be for it to be considered “self-realizing”? Innovation can take place
over vastly disparate time frames. Over a sufficiently long timeline,
most useful innovation is likely to be inevitable, regardless of what
external incentive structures are put in place. Yet temporal delays
in acquiring useful technologies themselves constitute a social
cost that might be glaring.86 For example, society suffers a loss if re-
searchers delay studying a potentially valuable cancer medication
85. See id. at 325.
86. See, e.g., Daniel R. Cahoy, An Incrementalist Approach to Patent Reform Policy, 9
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 587, 601 (2006).
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because they cannot recoup a pecuniary reward for their efforts.
The relevant question therefore is not whether an invention is
literally “inevitable” in that it will surely occur sooner or later, but
whether it would have materialized in a similarly expeditious
manner.87
Having defined an “inevitable” or “self-realizing” invention as one
that would occur on a comparable timeline irrespective of patent
protection, we can now try to identify what classes of innovative
activity would likely fall within this rubric. The task is considerably
more difficult than one might expect. In particular, the considerable
danger of false positives, in addition to the unacceptable repercus-
sions of an erroneous and unintended diminution in long term
innovation, require us to accept the patenting of some self-realizing
innovation. Nevertheless, as discussed below, we find that the risk
of inadvertent exclusion is acceptable with respect to certain areas
of innovation and we therefore advocate their elimination from the
patent system.
C. Self-Realizing Inventions
It is easy to assert that self-realizing inventions should be denied
patent protection. Putting that normative aspiration into effect is
considerably more difficult.
There would be something profoundly disquieting about a judge
determining on an ad hoc basis, without categorical guidance and
from an ex post perspective, whether a given patent application
before her claims something that would have been “inevitably”
discovered. Apart from the fact that most federal district court
judges do not have the specialized knowledge to make that determi-
nation, a rule that provides no more specificity than “deny any
claims that would have arisen irrespective of patent protection”
would surely be ineffective and perhaps dangerous, even in the
hands of experts. Instead, reliable heuristics are needed if the law
is to siphon off self-realizing inventions in a desirable fashion.
Categorical analysis reveals which spheres of innovative activity can
properly be treated with suspicion by a priori assumption and which
87. Id. 
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ones cannot. Although numerous areas subject to patent protection
might yield some inevitable inventions, the risk of false positives
associated with overbroad classifications precludes their exclusion.
This Section of the Article identifies the classes of invention that
can properly be presumed to be self-realizing. Part II then explains
how the patentable subject matter inquiry undertaken by the PTO
and the courts can be employed to exclude such inventions. We
conclude that this inquiry should be conducted such that it largely
siphons off business methods from the field of patentable subject
matter. Although the Federal Circuit’s recent decision in In re Bilski
partially implements this conclusion, it does so on the basis of
flawed analysis.88 This Article contends that when the Supreme
Court revisits Bilski, it should exclude certain subject matter on
explicitly utilitarian grounds.
1. Spontaneous Innovation: “Eureka” Inventions and        
Inadvertent Discoveries
The first potential category of self-realizing innovation relates to
discoveries or inventions that do not materialize pursuant to a
capital-intensive innovative process but instead from a sudden
“flash of genius.” Such inventions raise the question of how we
should treat discoveries that come not from protracted and expen-
sive research and development, but from ad hoc discovery. One can
broadly conclude that discoveries that entail a minimum of both
previous effort and subsequent utilization costs have a weak claim
to IP protection on utilitarian grounds. If a person has devoted no
pecuniary resources or human capital to solving a particular
problem or to discovering a new process, she hardly needs the
prospect of monopoly to incentivize her innovation.
Within the realm of spontaneous innovation, a special field of
note involves inadvertent discovery. Should the casual inventor who
unintentionally happens upon a discovery of ultimately monumental
importance be granted a pecuniary reward in the form of exclusive
rights?89 The question is of some importance, as history is replete
88. 545 F.3d 943, 963-64 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll,
129 S. Ct. 2735.
89. See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics
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with inventions of immense value that came about by pure happen-
stance.
Consider penicillin, for instance. Alexander Fleming was in the
process of researching staphylococci, a type of bacteria, when he
noticed that one of his sample dishes had been contaminated with
a fungus that prevented the spread of the bacteria.90 This fortuitous
discovery proved to be of unparalleled social value, saving countless
lives and treating even more illnesses.91 Yet humankind learned of
penicillin’s use not through dedicated research to a specific problem,
but through serendipity. Similar tales of valuable, yet inadvertent,
innovation abound.92
Given the demonstrable history of many crucial discoveries taking
place in unintentional fashion, one might conclude that IP protec-
tion would be ill-deserved in many of those cases. If someone
inadvertently discovers a new machine, manufacture, composition
of matter, or process, wouldn’t the existence of a patent reward have
little if any ex ante effect on the likelihood of such discovery?
The answer, perhaps surprisingly, is no. Indeed, there are strong
practical reasons for adopting a contrary normative position. In
most instances of inadvertent, valuable innovation, the inventor
may not have intended to uncover the ultimate discovery but was
working toward a distinct end.93 Alternatively, she may have been
researching a particular problem to probe possible applications
without any prior expectation of what those applications might be.94
In both of these situations, even if the actual discovery was
accidental, the patent system’s monetary rewards might have been
of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55, 78 n.107 (2003) [hereinafter Kieff,
Registering Patents].
90. See STUART B. LEVY, THE ANTIBIOTIC PARADOX: HOW THE MISUSE OF ANTIBIOTICS
DESTROYS THEIR CURATIVE POWERS 37-38 (2d ed. 2002).
91. Id.
92. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1581 (2003).
93. See LEVY, supra note 90, at 37-38 (describing Fleming’s discovery of penicillin while
working with bacteria).
94. See, e.g., W. Noel Keyes, Our Continued Need for Coordination of the United States
Constitution of the Eighteenth Century’s “Age of Enlightenment” with the Twenty-First
Century’s Ages of “Modern Science and Bioethics,” 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 951, 954 (2006)
(discussing Benjamin Franklin’s experiments with electricity and invention of the lightning
rod).
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the impetus for the inventor (or more likely, the company funding
the inventor), to pursue the research in the first place.
It is therefore not the case that unintended innovation involves
a dearth of ex ante capital and effort; indeed, the opposite is likely
the case.95 By making ex post rewards available to those who engage
in valuable innovation, the law encourages the devotion of capital
to research and development. As innovators know that their pri-
mary research may yield unexpected but valuable results in
unforeseen directions, their efforts will continue unabated. So a
denial of patent protection in ancillary or unforeseen discoveries
would reduce the incentive to innovate and narrow the field of
innovation.
It should be clear, then, that errors in categorical analysis are apt
to be preclusive in this context. Ultimately one must ask: to what
extent can preexisting patent principles be molded to deny protec-
tion to certain of these inventions, without also discouraging
innovation that is intimately related to and dependent upon the
anticipated award of IP? The answer in the present setting is plain.
There is simply no reliable basis for concluding that inadvertent
discoveries are any less worthy of ex post reward than the solution
to specifically targeted problems. And the law reflects this norma-
tive conclusion, as § 103 of the Patent Act provides that “[p]atent-
ability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention
was made.”96
But what of known problems that a person solves with a modicum
of effort? To illustrate, imagine a physicist who, in a moment of
genius, discovers a solution to an important practical problem that
has long stymied the physics community. Imagine, also, that this
person expended no pecuniary capital in solving the seemingly
intractable problem and that sufficient reputational reward existed
to have induced efforts by others within the community. As the in-
vention can be communicated to others merely by publishing or
otherwise explaining the solution, distributional costs are minimal.
In such situations, the utilitarian justification for patent (or
copyright) protection would appear to be at its minimum. Informed
by the teachings of economics, then, policymakers might be tempted
95. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 92, at 1581 n.12.
96. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006).
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not to award our hypothetical physicist any proprietary rights in
his discovery, or (more relevantly) to the useful application of that
discovery.97 Indeed, one might argue that discoveries of the forego-
ing type may be categorically denied IP protection on the grounds
that they would be discovered even if the IP system did not exist.
Again, however, that position takes too narrow a view of the
indirect effects of the IP system on innovation and ignores that a
given discovery might not occur if pecuniary rewards are categori-
cally unavailable for inventions that are discovered through little
effort. For example, our physicist must have attained a sufficient
level of physics knowledge to address the problem, knowledge that
likely required a considerable amount of human and financial
capital to be expended. Cut down on the money available for a
successful discovery and you reduce (on the margin) the incentive to
study physics in the first place. Moreover, research grants, including
from private entities, may have made the physicist’s research
possible. Remove from patent protection the whole category of dis-
coveries that were achieved with ease and the total pool of funds
available for research likely decreases. In short, given the advanced
state of the art in most fields of technological note, putting individu-
als in a sufficiently informed position to tackle taxing contemporary
problems is an onerous, capital intensive task that is easier taken
up if financial incentives are involved.
Additionally, even if one solves a scientific quandary with a
modicum of effort, commercial implementation of that discovery
may require the existence of property rights over the invention. A
rule that categorically denies patent protection to inadvertent
discoveries or ones achieved with near instantaneous success would
not only be massively overbroad but would also stifle the dissemina-
tion and commercialization of valuable information. Returning to
an earlier example, Alexander Fleming’s discovery of penicillin
did not immediately result in the creation of commercial antibiotics.
Instead, his paper was left for others to implement, which did not
take place until more than a decade later.98 Patent rights play an
97. See Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 89, at 78 n.107 (noting that “if the metric
were hard work, then accidental inventions would not be patentable”).
98. See James Robert Dean, Jr., FDA at War: Securing the Food That Secured Victory, 53
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 453, 497 (1998).
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important role in facilitating the commercialization of such dis-
coveries, even if they do not play a central role in unearthing the
discovery itself.99
Most vexing of all, it would seem nearly impossible to distinguish
between the inventor who solves an obstinate problem in a flash of
brilliance and the one who prevails only after years of devoted
effort. An inventor (or her employer) would always have a financial
incentive to claim that she poured blood, sweat, and tears into the
discovery, and the PTO and the courts would hardly be in a position
to determine if that were true. A rule that denied patent protection
to serendipitous or easily-achieved (but nonobvious) inventions
might also encourage wasteful conduct, such as encouraging an
inventor to engage in “busywork” to make it seem that the problem
she solved was really more complicated than it actually was.
So it is not necessarily the case that financial return in the form
of ownership of the resulting discovery will have limited impact on
ex ante efforts to discover a solution. Rather, it seems likely that the
creation of such inventions would, at a minimum, be indirectly
incentivized by the presence of a pecuniary reward. Moreover, a
system that denied patent protection to “eureka” or near-instanta-
neous inventions would likely be impossible to administer, and the
particular innovations in this realm that could be properly excluded
without untoward consequences would likely be extraordinarily
limited.
Accordingly, in order to find self-realizing innovation of the kind
that can reliably be excluded from patent protection by a priori
assumption, we must look further.
2. Innovation Made Pursuant to Social Incentives
A second category of “inevitable” innovation involves discoveries
spurred by reputational or institutional incentives to invent that
exist independent of proprietary control of any resulting invention.
The paradigmatic example of this kind of invention includes
99. See George E. Frost, Let’s Remember Sam, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 277,
288-89 (1994) (observing that “the stimulus of patent rights to the promotional activity is
often critical to the practical application of inventions” and citing Alexander Fleming’s
discovery of penicillin as an illustration).
926 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:897
discoveries by professors and researchers in academic settings,
where the need to publish is a prerequisite to achieving success and
tenure and where pecuniary incentives are thought to play a
diminished role.100
At first glance, the case for patent protection in such settings
might seem to be quite weak. If the creation of these inventions
would occur regardless of whether they were patentable, there is no
need to give property rights in these inventions and thereby create
unnecessary deadweight loss. For example, if a medical researcher
is studying a particular cancer gene because it is her life’s passion,
not because she cares about the pot of gold that might lie at the end
of her research, one might think that society need not provide her,
ex ante, with a monetary incentive to research because she would
do it anyway.
Again, however, there are a host of problems that prevent this
category of “inevitable” invention from being easily excluded from
patent protection. As before, administering such an exclusion would
be highly problematic. Although one inventor may not give a whit
about pecuniary awards, other inventors might put primacy of
place on such a prospect. For a court to distinguish between the
two—requiring it to drill down into subjective intent—would likely
be an impossible task.101 Moreover, categorically excluding from
patent protection inventions by “academics” would make it less
likely, at least on the margin, that those academics who care at
least somewhat about pecuniary rewards would enter the research
endeavor altogether.
Second, even if a particular researcher is not motivated by a
pecuniary incentive, the organization that employs her, whether it
be a university, research hospital, or nonprofit organization, might
very well care about obtaining property rights in her inventions.
The fact that such organizations care about patent rights is
evidenced by the large number of patent applications that these
100. See, e.g., Risa L. Lieberwitz, The Marketing of Higher Education: The Price of the
University’s Soul, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 763, 784 (2004); John Swinson, Copyright or Patent or
Both: An Algorithmic Approach to Computer Software Protection, 5 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 145,
167 n.73 (1991) (noting that “the academic may invent regardless of incentives”).
101. See, e.g., Kenneth Rosenthal, Prosecutor Misconduct, Convictions, and Double
Jeopardy: Case Studies in Emerging Jurisprudence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 887, 912 (1998) (noting
that “[p]roof of subjective intent is problematic in any setting”).
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organizations file and patents they hold.102 Indeed, in an era when
IP rights have taken on heightened importance, such organizations
would seem more likely than ever before to care about protecting
such rights.
Moreover, denying IP rights to academic institutions might have
significant negative spillover effects in other research areas not
related to the ones denied patent protection. If, for example, a
research university receives patent rights over a blockbuster new
drug, it can use the proceeds from licensing that patent to fund
other research projects. So denying pecuniary rights in these types
of inventions could have widespread and profoundly deleterious
effects on research activity in other realms.103
We must therefore continue our search for “inevitable” inventions
that can, as a practical matter, be excluded from the realm of
patentable subject matter.
3. Inventions Giving Rise to “Self-Consumption”—Herein of
Business Methods
As we shall see, inventions giving rise to “self-consumption” are
a particularly important category of self-realizing inventions. Under
102. See Dov Greenbaum, Academia to Industry Technology Transfer: An Alternative to the
Bayh-Dole System for Both Developed and Developing Nations, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 311, 377 (2009) (noting the pervasive patent culture at universities); Peter
Mikhail, Note, Hopkins v. CellPro: An Illustration That Patenting and Exclusive Licensing of
Fundamental Science is Not Always in the Public Interest, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 375, 375
(2000) (noting that “[b]ecause the prestige and royalties associated with patents have replaced
the traditional reward of publication and recognition in the furtherance of science, the
university is starting to resemble commercial research laboratory”); see also Ron A. Bouchard,
Balancing Public and Private Interests in the Commercialization of Publicly Funded Medical
Research: Is There a Role for Compulsory Government Royalty Fees?, 13 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH.
L. 120, 165 (2007) (discussing the public contribution to university research costs stemming
from the “transaction costs of [an] inefficient patent and regulatory system”); Risa L.
Lieberwitz, Law: The Corporatization of Academic Research: Whose Interests Are Served?, 38
AKRON L. REV. 759, 764-65 (2005) (noting the impact of the Bayh-Doyle Act on new patent
applications filed by American universities since 1980).
103. The positive spillover effects associated with patent grants are well known. See, e.g.,
Robert Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The Impact of Compulsory Licensing on Foreign Direct
Investment: A Collective Bargaining Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 283, 285 n.6 (2008) (citing
Bronwyn H. Hall, The Private and Social Returns to Research and Development, in
TECHNOLOGY, R&D, AND THE ECONOMY 140, 140-41 (Bruce L.R. Smith & Claude E. Barfield
eds., 1996)) (summarizing the positive spillover effects from innovative activity).
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standard economic theory, when someone consumes a product or
service, she usually does so because consumption increases her
utility in some way.104 For example, a consumer might buy a
particular good she wants to own or a particular service she needs
completed. Similarly, a company might purchase a new piece of
capital equipment to achieve its goals more efficiently.
Sometimes, however, a company consumes an invention—often-
times a process—that it invents itself. The paradigmatic modern
example of a “self-consumed” invention is the business method.105
For example, suppose an inventor at a company comes up with a
more efficient process for creating a product that the company sells.
Regardless of whether the product is patentable, the company and
its agent (that is, the inventor) have an independent incentive to
invent the process because it cuts costs and hence improves the
company’s bottom line.
At first glance, it would seem that no patent right would be
necessary to promote this kind of invention because the profit
motive would encourage its production anyway. Perhaps this is the
first category of “self-realizing” inventions we have encountered that
we can exclude from the patent system?
Perhaps, though the matter is not as simple as it first seems.
To illustrate the effect of the patent system on such innovation,
imagine a world without patent protection. We start with “standard”
inventions, which we define as ones that the inventor does not con-
sume herself.
Suppose an inventor at GE discovers a new filament for light
bulbs that is cheaper than, but just as effective as, a conventional
light bulb filament. Now suppose that this invention enables GE to
cut the marginal cost of manufacturing and marketing a light bulb
from $2.00 to $1.80 per bulb. Assume also that the relevant market
is subject to perfect competition, such that price equals marginal
cost. Thus, the preinvention market price is $2.00. Under standard
economic theory, and given its marginal cost-reducing innovation,
104. See, e.g., HUGH GRAVELLE & RAY REES, MICROECONOMICS 11-45 (3d ed. Prentice Hall
2004).
105. See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 155 (2d ed. 1997) (“[T]he
relatively frequent innovations in the financial services industry prior to the era of
patentability suggest that firms had adequate means to appropriate the value of their new
financial innovations.”). 
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GE could then sell the light bulb at $2.00 – ε (that is, $1.99), and
thereby capture the entire market.106
GE’s competitors, however, will not just idly sit back (for if they
do, they will lose market share and perhaps go out of business).
Rather, the competitors will seek out their own inventions to cut the
price of their light bulbs, or more likely, they will buy a GE light
bulb and use reverse-engineering to determine the composition of
GE’s new filament. Once that is accomplished, they can freely use
the new filament in their light bulb (because in this hypothetical
world, there would be no patents to protect GE’s invention).
Of course, there is a cost to reverse-engineering, and there are
certain inventions that cannot be reverse-engineered at all.107 But
there is a good reason to believe that the cost of reverse-engineering
will generally be less than the cost of engineering a product in the
first instance. Creating something new (from scratch) is generally
harder and more expensive than copying an invention that already
exists.108 So it is a fair assumption that if it is possible to reverse-
engineer the new filament, and the benefits from selling the new
filament are substantial, then some competitors will attempt to
reconstruct the relevant technology.
Assuming GE’s competitors can successfully reverse-engineer the
filament, they too should be able to sell the improved light bulb at
a price as low as $1.80. In fact, given the significant costs that GE
might expend in designing the new light bulb—costs that its
competitors would not have to incur—it is possible that GE might
not be able to recoup its sunk investment with a price of $1.80. GE’s
106. There is some reason to question whether the market actually works this way. For
example, if GE were a market leader with a well-defined brand name for light bulbs (or if it
maintained a reputation as selling better light bulbs), it could retain its market share even
if it sold slightly more expensive light bulbs. On the other hand, if a lesser-known company
invented the improved, low-cost filament, it is possible that it would not capture an increase
in market share simply because people prefer the “brand name,” GE. There is a cost, from the
perspective of a risk-averse consumer, in changing brands to something unfamiliar. If that
cost exceeds the monetary benefit of choosing the new brand, the consumer might refrain from
switching to the new brand, even if doing so would be in her best interest. Nevertheless, for
illustrative purposes, the current hypothetical suffices.
107. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 24 (D.D.C. 1999) (discussing
the practical impossibility of a competitor cloning the 32-bit Windows API).
108. Were this not the case, we would see considerably less reverse-engineering in practice.
See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse
Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1587 (2002).
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competitors, in contrast, did not have to pay for the fixed cost of the
innovation and only had to pay the likely reduced cost of reverse-
engineering. Hence, it is conceivable that GE would actually be in
a worse position than if it had not invented the filament at all.
Now consider GE’s position ex ante. It knows that research on a
new light bulb might yield a promising new product. But it also
knows that in a world without patents, this invention could be
copied by reverse-engineering. So GE’s ex ante decision about
whether to spend money researching the new filament would bal-
ance factors such as the probable cost of the research, the chance of
success, the likely benefits from a successful product, the likelihood
of competitors trying to adopt the same technology, and the probable
cost and time it would take for competitors to reverse-engineer the
product and bring it to market. It should be clear from this example
that obtaining a patent—which would allow GE to prevent its
competitors from copying its invention—would help tilt this
otherwise murky mix of factors in favor of innovation. Hence, the
potential of the patent system to incentivize such innovation is
clear.
Now consider a different invention—suppose GE discovers a new
method of manufacturing a light bulb within its factory that enables
it to reduce the marginal cost of a bulb to $1.80. Perhaps GE
accomplishes this by discovering a novel way to cut costs on labor
(for example, through better use of automation) or by using a better
way to reorganize its assembly line so that costs are reduced. This
new process is an example of a “self-consumed” invention—one that
is consumed by the inventor (or his company). Such an invention
does not appear in the final product that is sold, even though it
decreases the cost of the final product.
As we have seen, both the new light bulb filament and the self-
consumed business method for producing a light bulb reduce the
marginal cost of the light bulb by 10 percent (from $2.00 to $1.80).
And in theory, both of these inventions have the same potential to
increase the inventor’s (or his company’s) bottom line, so an
inventor should be equally incentivized to invent either. But
although we saw that patent protection would greatly enhance the
incentives for creating the new filament (the “standard” invention),
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it is less clear whether patent protection is needed to incentivize the
creation of the business method (the “self-consumed” invention).
The reason for this difference is that inventors and their com-
petitors treat “standard” inventions and “self-consumed” inventions
differently. Indeed, there are at least three characteristics that
plausibly distinguish “self-consumed” inventions and make (at least
a subset of) them less in need of patent protection.
First, and perhaps most importantly, self-consumed inventions
are often invisible to competitors, and hence the cost of reverse-
engineering them is higher than standard inventions. The hidden
nature of a self-consumed invention stems, not surprisingly, from
the fact that the invention is consumed by its producer. Unlike the
new filament, which a competitor could obtain just by going to the
store, the self-consumed business method is largely hidden from
competitors and copying it requires inside information on how GE
runs its light bulb factory. Of course, some of this information could
be obtained by hiring former GE employees who could spill these
manufacturing secrets or by using some other form of corporate
espionage, but noncompete agreements and legal sanctions exist to
discourage this kind of behavior.109 Moreover, to the extent that GE
maintains confidentiality over its business process, trade secret
law would protect that innovation as well. In short, because self-
consumed inventions are used by the creator of the invention, it is
often harder and costlier for competitors to obtain information about
these inventions than information about “standard” inventions.
Accordingly, companies can feel more confident that, once invented,
they do not have to pursue patent rights to protect self-consumed
internal business processes.
Second, it is likely that self-consumed inventions are, on average,
less expensive to create as compared to “standard” inventions. A
major reason for this is that commercialization costs are not a major
issue for self-consumed inventions. Once invented, a self-consumed
invention need not be distilled into a “commercial” form for con-
sumers. This, of course, is because the only consumer that matters
for such an invention is the producer itself.110 Given that commercial
109. See Lemley, Surprising Virtues, supra note 49, at 9-11.
110. A self-consumed invention also need not be marketed in the same way as a standard
invention, which also results in cost savings. This is not to say that a company could not tout
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implementation is often a large portion of the total cost of bringing
an invention from concept to final product, the absence of this cost
in self-consumed inventions makes them, in this sense, relatively
cheaper.111 And because the costs of creating the invention are
cheaper, there is less of a need for patent rights to protect the
inventor’s investment in creating the invention in the first place.112
Finally, unlike standard inventions, self-consumed inventions are
tailored to only one consumer—the company producing the inven-
tion itself. It follows that the value a competitor might get in
stealing or reverse-engineering such an invention is often less.
Returning to the light bulb example, GE’s novel business method for
reducing the cost of manufacturing a light bulb might work only in
the manufacturing setting in which GE operates. A competitor
would benefit from expropriating the business method only to the
extent that it could be applied in its own manufacturing setting.
To illustrate more concretely, if the business method involves
automating a particular portion of the manufacturing process or
implementing a more efficient way of managing inventory, then
those business practices are likely to be quite GE-specific and de-
pend on the particular attributes of GE’s manufacturing facilities.
Of course, it is possible that a competitor could pick and choose
aspects of this invention that are applicable to its own facility. But
unlike in the standard context in which, in the absence of patent
rights, a properly reverse-engineered product is identical to the
product it is copying, there is a diminished probability that a
its novel, self-consumed invention as a way to distinguish itself from the competition. For
example, GE could note that its novel light bulb manufacturing process produces better lights
at lower cost as a way of “branding” itself.
111. See Kieff, Property Rights, supra note 70, at 707-08 (discussing the costs of commercial
implementation).
112. Another potential reason that self-consumed inventions are cheaper is that they
arguably require less research and development capital than standard inventions. This
pertains to the relative complexity of coming up with a “standard” invention versus a self-
consumed invention. Returning to the light bulb example, GE could improve its filament in
a myriad of different ways—for example, it could try to design a bulb that is brighter, longer
lasting, more environmentally friendly, cheaper, and so on. There are many “degrees of
freedom” in which this form of innovation can operate. On the other hand, the degrees of
freedom are often more limited when it comes to self-consumed inventions, as they are often
motivated by a singular consideration—cutting cost. As noted, this is something that a
company is likely to be looking into anyway; it hardly needs patent rights to incentivize
prudent cost-cutting and the installation of more efficient production technology.
2009] SELF-REALIZING INVENTIONS 933
competitor would be able to appropriate the entire value of a self-
consumed, internal business method. Because the benefit that
competitors gain from appropriating a self-consumed invention is
less than that from a “standard” invention, the competitors’ in-
centive to expropriate the self-consumed invention is also dimin-
ished, and so is the need for patent rights to protect that invention
in the first place.
Given these characteristics, we can see that there is less of a need
to patent self-consumed inventions, particularly those that are
internal business methods. We would expect, therefore, that many
companies would choose not to patent such methods,113 given the
relatively heavy (and growing) cost of obtaining a patent and
asserting it in court. Indeed, we would expect that such companies
would rely primarily on trade secret law as a means of protecting
their self-consumed business methods,114 and that the only business
methods that would be patented would be ones that were quite
visible to competitors and could be easily copied.
But in fact, that is not what we see. Even if there is little chance
of reverse-engineering certain self-consumed business methods, we
see companies trying to patent these inventions anyway. Indeed, the
growth of business method patents has exploded after the Federal
Circuit’s 1998 decision in State Street Bank.115
If these companies are not worried about their business methods
being copied—if, for example, these methods could easily be kept
secret and cost little to develop—then why do these companies
113. This conclusion holds generally true for non-self-revealing inventions, which inventors
have no rational basis to patent. For one author’s more expansive views on this subject, see
Alan Devlin, Restricting Experimental Use, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 626-28 (2009). As
noted below, a major exception to this conclusion lies in abuse of the patent system. The
inventor of a non-self-revealing process may wish to use the patent system to enjoin the use
of similar trade secret protected processes by his rivals. 
114. There are other reasons to suspect that trade secrets would be a better avenue of IP
protection for many business methods. For example, a company may not want to patent a
business method whose operation is closely tied with a confidential or trade secret protected
practice. If Coca-Cola devises a new method for mixing ingredients to produce Coke, it might
not want to disclose that method simply because the enablement and best mode requirements
might require the company to disclose information that would shed light on its secret Coke
formula. So a company might not want to reveal business methods that give competitors some
tangential insight into an otherwise confidential business operation.
115. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1004-05 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Mayer, J.,
dissenting), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009).
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go through the cost and trouble of patenting these inventions? In
other words, what is the advantage of patenting internal business
methods that do not need patent protection? Occam’s razor provides
an answer, and the simplest explanation is both convincing and
troubling: the companies are trying to create patent portfolios that
they can use offensively against their competitors, rather than as a
means to recoup fixed costs in creating the invention.116 By creating
these kinds of patent portfolios, companies put themselves in a
position to attack competitors who use their business methods.117
Indeed, the existing literature on business method patents high-
lights the many ways in which this kind of conduct can occur.118
Moreover, not only are business method patents often used as a
sword, these patents also can be used as a shield. In many situa-
tions, companies are locked in a prisoner’s dilemma—each one
would be better off if no one decided to obtain any business method
patents because they would all save the cost and trouble of ob-
taining and fighting over these exclusivity-protected processes.
However, each company individually has an incentive to obtain as
many patents as possible because that enables it to use the patents
offensively and gives it a competitive advantage over its rivals. As
a result, companies engage in a patent arms race, gathering up
business method (and other) patents at an increasing rate.119 In
such a situation, business method patents are not encouraging the
creation of new and useful methods of conducting business—indeed,
companies would implement internal business methods regardless
116. Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Acquiring Innovation, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 775,
790-91 (2008).
117. Moreover, if the business method itself is not that complicated (though it is
nonobvious), an inventor might seek to patent the method simply to forestall the competitor
from independently discovering that or a similar method, which, given the simplicity of the
business method, the competitor inevitably would do.
118. There is also a perverse interaction between patent law and trade secret law that
encourages this kind of “offensive” patent use. When a company keeps a business method a
trade secret, that method does not count as prior art for purposes of patentability. Hence a
company could obtain a patent on a business method that another company had invented first
and was using in secret; the patentee could then preclude that company from using the
method, even though the company had invented the method first.
119. The phenomenon of patent races is far from desirable. See generally Michael R. Baye
& Heidrun C. Hoppe, The Strategic Equivalence of Rent-Seeking, Innovation, and Patent-Race
Games, 44 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 217 (2003), available at http://www.nash-equilibrium.
com/baye/Innovation.pdf (noting the negative externalities associated with patent races).
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of whether they could obtain patent protection for them. Rather,
such business method patents are obtained simply as a form of
strategic maneuvering vis-à-vis a competitor. Needless to say, the
net social benefit of such actions is dubious.120
But what about the many self-consumed business method patents
that, as noted above, might not be easily discovered and expropri-
ated by competitors? What would be the purpose of obtaining patent
protection on these business methods if competitors are not going to
discover or use them anyway?
A potential explanation here stems from the uncertainty sur-
rounding patent grants. As compared to IP rights, the metes and
bounds of patents are relatively indeterminate.121 Despite the
primacy of patent claim language, where a patent grant begins and
where it ends is usually a matter of interpretation.122 Indeed, it is
often uncertain whether a patent claim is valid at all, given the
many ways in which it can be invalidated in court and the high
probability that this will occur.123
Hence, even if a competitor’s business method does not infringe
on a patent by an objectively verifiable metric, if it comes close to
doing so (or at least close enough that a patentee can make a
nonfrivolous argument of infringement), then the patentee can sue
the competitor on the patent.124 The patentee could have myriad
reasons for doing this—as noted, it could be trying to use the patent
as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the competitor (given that
the competitor probably has his own slew of patents that it can
assert against the patentee), or the patentee could be trying to use
the patent offensively to harm its competitor.
This potential for strategic behavior, along with the general
monopoly costs associated with patents, suggests that it is particu-
larly harmful to allow patenting of internal business methods.
Moreover, like other self-consumed inventions, such business
120. Id.
121. See Alan Devlin, Indeterminism and the Property-Patent Equation, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 17-24), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1435902.
122. See id.
123. See generally Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON.
PERSP. 75 (2005).
124.  See Devlin, supra note 121, at 17-24.
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methods are likely to be produced even in the absence of patent
protection because they are largely invisible to competitors and are
often produced pursuant to standard cost-cutting procedures.
In sum, therefore, self-consumed inventions—particularly inter-
nal business methods—are arguably a determinate and well-
delineated example of self-realizing inventions that can be excluded
from patent protection. Part II below indicates how the patent
system could accomplish this, focusing in particular on the import
of the Federal Circuit’s recent decision in In re Bilski.125
II. TYING THE PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER INQUIRY TO    
UTILITARIANISM
The preceding Part described the patent system’s utilitarian
foundation, indicated the profound incongruity within the present
body of law that allows the patenting of much self-realizing
innovation, and demarcated the boundaries of inevitable invention
that can safely be withdrawn from the sphere of patent protection.
This Part advocates the use of the patentable subject matter inquiry
as a threshold screening device to deny patentability to certain
inevitable inventions. To understand this argument, it is important
both to appreciate the contemporary legal rules governing the
foregoing inquiry and to review historical precedent that continues
to yield great explanatory power. Part II.A performs these tasks and
explains how the patentable subject matter inquiry has gone astray,
bearing little if any relation to the incentives the patent system is
supposed to bestow. Part II.B then charts a path toward correcting
this problem by describing an “incentive to invent” theory of pat-
entable subject matter.
A. Process Patents and the Evolution of Patentable Subject Matter
This Section first describes the core patentable subject matter
exclusion—the prohibition on patenting of abstract ideas, laws of
nature, and scientific principles. It then tracks how this core ex-
clusion has informed the development of the somewhat tortured and
125. 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 77 S. Ct.
2735 (2009).
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incongruous jurisprudence on subject matter eligibility. Consistent
with Part I.C.3’s identification of certain business methods as the
most likely category of excludable self-realizing processes, this
discussion explains the evolution of law governing these phenom-
ena. It also highlights the remarkably attenuated relationship
between the development of this doctrine and patent law’s utilitar-
ian foundation. The Section concludes by analyzing In re Bilski and
exploring its consequences.
1. The Core Exclusion: Abstract Ideas, Laws of Nature, and
Scientific Principles
The question of which forms of innovation should be eligible for
patent protection is a fundamental one. At first blush, one could be
forgiven for concluding that any promotion of scientific knowledge
ought to be patent-eligible, if only because technological progress of
any kind is presumably worth incentivizing. Indeed, the U.S.
Constitution provides that Congress should “promote the Progress
of Science ... by securing for limited Times to ... Inventors the
exclusive Right to their ... Discoveries.”126 Given the separate
gatekeepers of patentability—utility, nonobviousness and nov-
elty—which in theory cumulatively operate to ensure that only
worthy inventions qualify, one might question the need for categori-
cal exclusions of any kind of subject matter.
Nevertheless, the exclusion of certain categories of innovation is,
and always has been, a foundational tenet of the patent system.127
Most fundamentally, the law prohibits the patenting of abstract
ideas, scientific and mathematical principles, and laws or products
of nature.128 As the U.S. Supreme Court has declared: “[A] principle
is not patentable. A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental
truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented.”129 As
a result, even major scientific discoveries, such as Einstein’s E = mc2
126. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
127. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437
U.S. 584 (1978)); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo
Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112-21 (1853);
Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852).
128. Diamond, 447 U.S. at 309.
129. Tatham, 55 U.S. at 175.
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equation, cannot be patented.130 However, the useful application of
such discoveries toward specific ends may qualify for protection.131
If we accept that the sole purpose of the patent system is to create
an incentive to invent valuable technology and bring it to market,
the rule that abstract ideas and discoveries are not patentable must
make economic sense. Yet it is not clear that it does. The principal
function of the patent grant is to allow a deserving inventor to
appropriate a certain proportion of the social value associated with
his invention or discovery.132 The more valuable the innovation, the
greater the demand for the information, which means the greater
the pecuniary reward to the inventor, and thus the greater the
incentive to engage in the process of innovation ex ante.
The discovery of theretofore unappreciated fundamental truths
may be of immense value. Moreover, the process of this discovery
may have been extraordinarily onerous, both in terms of human and
pecuniary capital. Although allowing an upstream discovery of
considerable practical importance to be patented may entail large
negotiation and transaction costs, those costs are what create value
for the inventor ex post. In a single-period state of the world, social
welfare is clearly maximized by allowing open access. But as
explained above, not all fundamental truths and laws of nature are
discovered pursuant to a cost-free process. Indeed, the opposite is
surely the case. From a utilitarian perspective, therefore, one can
perhaps legitimately question the law’s exclusion of scientific
principles and abstract ideas from the realm of patentability.
Regardless of this criticism, the fact remains that the prohibition
is so firmly ingrained within the patent system that no one could
reasonably expect to change it. Moreover, this tenet of the law is of
limited practical concern. One discovering an abstract idea should
be able to apply that idea to a specific end and thereby derive
pecuniary value from the discovery’s practical application.133 If such
an application is not possible, one might question the true value of
the idea (or at least the idea’s short-term value).
130. See Kieff, Property Rights, supra note 70, at 745.
131. Id.
132. See Abramowicz, supra note 61, at 812.
133. See State St. Bank v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(noting that “a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter employing a law of
nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea is patentable subject matter”).
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A more relevant issue involves instances when the prohibition on
patenting “abstract” ideas has influenced how courts have treated
other areas of broader concern. Such areas include computer
software, which involves the use of mathematical algorithms that
by themselves would not be patentable,134 and business methods,
which bear an innate relationship to intangible ideas and mental
steps.135 The somewhat abstract nature of these categories of
inventions has long led courts to view them with a degree of
suspicion, leading to a convoluted jurisprudence concerning their
patentability.
2. Toward the “Useful, Concrete and Tangible Result” Test
The law has displayed a far greater wariness toward process
patent applications than those directed at machines, manufactures,
or compositions of matter (collectively, products).136 This caution
emanates from a judicial aversion to innovation that takes an
abstract form, as compared to innovation that results in a concrete,
tangible product.137 By placing an unwarranted focus on abstraction,
the courts have lost sight of the utilitarian purpose of the patent
laws. Business methods, computer programs, and other methods
should not be denied patent protection merely because they are
more “abstract” than other inventions. Rather, patent protection
should be denied only if such a reward were not necessary to induce
the creation and dissemination of the method. In other words, the
relevant inquiry of whether a method should be patentable should
be framed in economic terms, under an incentive to invent rationale.
The law’s misguided preoccupation with abstraction has been
long-standing. For example, it was long understood that processes
134. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
135. See In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Questions of patentability
also surround genetically engineered organisms, with protection being denied where the
organisms are a “product of nature.” See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-10 (1980)
(overruling the determination of a patent examiner who had concluded that a genetically
engineered bacterium was a product of nature, and holding that man-made genetically
engineered bacterium was not found in nature).
136. See, e.g., Peter Yun-Hyoung Lee, Inverting the Logic of Scientific Discovery: Applying
Common Law Patentable Subject Matter Doctrine To Constrain Patents on Biotechnology
Research Tools, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 79, 104 (2005).
137. See id.
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that did not involve a physical transformation were not pat-
entable.138 Although this limitation has since been discarded, courts
remain focused on the abstract nature of an invention,139 particu-
larly with regard to the patentability of business methods and
computer programs.
Taking the former sphere of innovative activity first, it was long
the rule that methods of doing business were not patentable under
any circumstances. In 1893, the Southern District of New York
emphasized that “a method of transacting common business” did
not fall within the sphere of patentable subject matter.140 Soon
thereafter, in the well-known case of Hotel Security Checking Co. v.
Lorraine Co., the Second Circuit held that a “system of transacting
business disconnected from the means of carrying out the system is
not, within the most liberal interpretation of the term, an art” that
may be patented.141 The court explicitly based its determination on
the fact that “[n]o mere abstraction, no idea, however brilliant, can
be the subject of a patent.”142
Such judicial focus on abstraction is, as explained above, ill-
placed. Rather, the focus of the relevant inquiry should be on the
underlying incentive to invent rationale for the patent system. The
Second Circuit in Lorraine gave some credence to this concern,
explaining its skepticism in part because the business method at
issue “would ... occur to any clever and ingenious person familiar
with the needs of that business. The truth of this proposition will be
made apparent by a brief survey of the prior art.”143
Although this insight is consistent with economic principles, it
was made pursuant to the wrong inquiry. The question is whether
business methods as a category should be patentable. Only when
138. See, e.g., Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787-88 (1876).
139. See In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 294-96 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (opining that subject matter
that is merely “representative of” physical things may be patentable).
140. U.S. Credit Sys. Co. v. Am. Credit Indem. Co., 53 F. 818, 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1893).
141. 160 F. 467, 469 (2d Cir. 1908).
142. Id. Other subsequent cases also echoed the same prohibition on business methods.
See, e.g., Loew’s Drive-In Theatres, Inc. v. Park-In Theatres, Inc., 174 F.2d 547, 552 (1st Cir.
1949) (“[A] system for the transaction of business, such, for example, as the cafeteria system
for transacting the restaurant business, or similarly the open-air drive-in system for
conducting the motion picture theatre business, however novel, useful, or commercially
successful is not patentable.”).
143. Hotel Security Checking, 160 F. at 470.
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this threshold is reached should the courts move to consider the
more general requirements of patentability, including the obvious-
ness and novelty conditions noted by the court. Thus, although the
Second Circuit was quite right as a utilitarian matter to be con-
cerned over the novelty and utility of the relevant business method,
such concern was premature insofar as the court used the facts of
the particular case to make a broader pronouncement about
business methods.
More generally, the Supreme Court has long struggled to artic-
ulate congruent principles governing the patentability of processes.
Over a series of cases, the Court attempted to reconcile its manifest
aversion to abstraction with the unquestionably useful claimed
methods that were coming before it. The result was an inharmoni-
ous body of law that was, and is, difficult to reconcile. The most
important decisions that made up this law were three decisions
issued by the Court within a span of ten years: Gottschalk v.
Benson,144 Parker v. Flook,145 and Diamond v. Diehr.146
For the purposes of this Article, there is neither need nor space
to delve into these cases in great depth. Nevertheless, a brief
overview of their principal holdings is helpful. In Benson, the Court
confronted an algorithm that converted binary-coded decimal
numerals into pure binary numerals on a general purpose com-
puter.147 In holding that the claim at issue failed to state patentable
subject matter, the Court found that the claim involved neither a
transformation nor the use of a specialized computer or other
machine.148 As a result, “the patent would wholly pre-empt the
mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on
the algorithm itself.”149 Benson exposed the tension between the
judiciary’s fundamental prohibition on the patenting of abstract
ideas and the statutory provision that “any new and useful process”
be patentable.150
144. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
145. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
146. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
147. Benson, 409 U.S. at 64.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 72.
150. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
942 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:897
Subsequent leading decisions did little to harmonize the uneasy
tension between an ill-conceived judicial aversion to abstraction (an
element of which is inherent in virtually any method)151 and the
explicit congressional mandate that new and useful processes be
patentable. In Flook, the Court again denied patent protection, this
time to a method for monitoring a catalytic conversion process by
updating alarm limits based on variables such as pressure and
temperature.152 The claimed process entailed the use of a mathemat-
ical algorithm, which the Court viewed as nonpatentable subject
matter.153 In so holding, the Court determined that “conventional or
obvious” postsolution activity cannot transform an otherwise
unpatentable principle into a patentable process.154
In Diehr, the Court signaled a change in direction, displaying
greater flexibility toward allowed processes that entail the use of
mathematical algorithms to be patented.155 The inventor at issue
claimed a method for curing rubber in a mold, using a commonly
known algorithm to calculate the length of time the mold should
remain closed.156 The Court deemed the invention patentable,
notwithstanding its recent preceding decisions in Benson and Flook.
It justified this outcome on the basis that the process was centered
not on a mathematical algorithm but an industrial process.157 The
Court strained to reconcile the relevant case law—a difficulty aptly
pointed out by Justice Stevens in dissent.158
As Diehr demonstrates, by the early 1980s, the Court was clearly
moving in favor of expanding eligible subject matter. Still, this
trend of cases remained highly averse to abstract methods—
indeed, the Diehr Court was explicitly wary of granting claims that
might “seek to pre-empt the use of ” a fundamental principle.159
The more industrial and tangible the method that employed a
mathematical algorithm, the more likely it was (and is) to be
151. Indeed, this is a point that has been recognized by the Supreme Court itself. See
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978). 
152. Id. at 585-86.
153. Id. at 585.
154. Id. at 590.
155. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
156. Id. at 179.
157. Id. at 184.
158. Id. at 200-05 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 187 (majority opinion).
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patentable. Unfortunately, this trend persists even when patent
protection might be necessary to incentivize the creation of an
“abstract” invention in the first place.
Given this myopic judicial focus on abstraction rather than
incentives, it was perhaps only a matter of time before the converse
problem appeared: nonabstract but self-realizing methods of con-
ducting business were deemed patentable. In 1998, the Federal
Circuit cast aside the prohibition on business method patents and
certain other processes in its ground-breaking decision in State
Street Bank.160 The court stated that the “question of whether a
claim encompasses statutory subject matter should not focus on
which of the four categories of subject matter a claim is directed
to—process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter—but
rather on the essential characteristics of the subject matter, in
particular, the practical utility.”161 The court then looked beyond any
categorical exclusion of business methods and instead held that a
process, in order to be patentable, must merely produce “a useful,
concrete and tangible result.”162
State Street Bank was subsequently reinforced by another
seminal case, AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., which
brought the distinct legal treatment of computer software to an
end.163 In its holding, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed the primacy of
the “useful, concrete and tangible result” standard, and disavowed
any suggestion that a process must embody a physical limitation or
element to be patentable.164
State Street Bank was closely followed by a deluge of patent
applications claiming methods of practicing business in a field that
had previously borne witness to few, if any.165 Although the PTO has
long been accused of failing to screen applications properly, with the
160. State St. Bank v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
161. Id. at 1375.
162. Id. at 1373 (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
163. 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
164. Id. at 1359.
165. See supra notes 29-30; see also In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en
banc) (Mayer, J., dissenting), cert. granted sub. nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009)
(“State Street has launched a legal tsunami, inundating the patent office with applications
seeking protection for common business practices.”); Matthew E. Fink, Note, Patenting
Business Methods in Europe: What Lies Ahead?, 79 IND. L.J. 299, 301 (2004).
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result that many patents are improvidently granted, the PTO’s
performance has been especially poor with respect to business
methods.166 The Supreme Court has explicitly referred to the
“potential vagueness and suspect validity” of many of these par-
ticular patents.167 The qualitative deficiency can be explained in
large part by the lack of prior art before the PTO, which made the
agency’s determinations of novelty and nonobviousness far more
difficult.168
Among the vast number of patents issued over business methods,
some particularly egregious examples stand out.169 Amazon’s “one-
click” patent is perhaps the most notorious, which claimed a
“method and system for placing a purchase order via communica-
tions network.”170 The process consisted of storing customers’ credit
card and other relevant information such that they could make a
purchase with a single click upon a return visit.171 Having obtained
a patent, the online superstore promptly brought an action against
Barnes & Noble to enjoin use of the latter’s “Express Lane” shop-
ping mechanism.172 The district court found in favor of Amazon and
granted it a preliminary injunction, and this finding was sustained
on appeal.173 The result was aptly deemed “ridiculous” by some
commentators, including Professor Lawrence Lessig.174 Notably, one
of Amazon’s founding programmers, Paul Barton-Davis, character-
166. See, e.g., Jason Taketa, Note, The Future of Business Method Software Patents in the
International Intellectual Property System, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 943, 955 (2002).
167. See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 397 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
168. See Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property
Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 589-91
(1999). 
169. For a representative discussion, see In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1004-05 (Mayer, J.,
dissenting).
170. U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411, at [54] (filed Sept. 12, 1997). See generally Lois Matelan,
The Continuing Controversy over Business Methods Patents, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 125, 134-35 (2008).
171. ’411 Patent col.10 1.15-1.46.
172. See Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (W.D. Wash.
1999), vacated, Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
173. Id.
174. See Thomas E. Weber, Battles over Patents Threaten To Damp Web’s Innovative Spirit,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 1999, at B1.
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ized Amazon’s one-click patent as “a cynical and ungrateful use of
an extremely obvious technology.”175
If one adheres to the perspective that any valuable technological
advancement over the prior art should be worthy of patent protec-
tion (if capable of being applied to a specific purpose, of course176)
then there is much to find pleasing in State Street Bank and AT&T.
The Federal Circuit merely required that a process not be inescap-
ably abstract. To render a method patentable, an inventor need only
find a useful application of that method with real-life effects.
The problem, of course, is that although the court was correct to
focus on the underlying nature of the subject matter, it prematurely
and myopically focused on utility. Rather than determine whether
patent protection was needed to incentivize the invention of a useful
process, the court allowed all such useful methods to be patentable.
But as explored previously in this Article, even enormously useful
inventions should not receive patent protection if sufficient alterna-
tive incentives to innovate and commercialize exist outside of the
patent system.177 State Street Bank and AT&T miss this crucial
point. More specifically, their fatal shortcoming lies in overlooking
that self-realizing inventions should be excluded from patent
protection—a deficiency whose harm increases the more useful the
claimed process at issue.178
3. In re Bilski
Given the immense controversy surrounding business method
patents, in late 2008, the Federal Circuit finally revisited its prior
holding in State Street Bank. In In re Bilski, the court overruled its
prior holding, discarding the “useful, tangible and concrete result”
175. See Sirkka L. Jarvenpaa & Emerson H. Tiller, Protecting Internet Business Methods:
Amazon.com and the 1-Click Checkout (Mar. 30, 2001), http://btl.mccombs.utexas.edu/IBM
%20Course%20modules/bizmethpatents1.pdf (unpublished course materials).
176. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981) (“It is now commonplace that an
application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may
well be deserving of patent protection.”).
177. Moreover, the “useful, concrete and tangible result” condition of patentability is
tantamount to meeting an elevated utility requirement and would thus seem to have limited
independent purpose. See supra Part I.A.2.
178. This is because the greater the demand for the discovery, the greater the allocative
inefficiency created by a patent grant. See supra Part I.B.
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test and adopting a requirement that a process either be tied to a
particular machine or apparatus or transform an article into a
different state or thing.179
Bilski involved a method for “hedging risk in the field of commodi-
ties trading.”180 Writing for the court, Chief Judge Michel properly
noted that the patent-eligible subject matter inquiry is a threshold
one, which can bar a claim irrespective of its nonobviousness,
utility, or novelty.181 He noted too that the claimed method fell
within the literal terms of the Patent Act but emphasized that “the
meaning of ‘process’ as used in § 101 is narrower than its ordinary
meaning.”182 Surveying the Supreme Court precedent discussed
supra, the court framed the issue as a simple one; namely, “whether
Applicants are seeking to claim a fundamental principle (such as an
abstract idea) or a mental process.”183
Chief Judge Michel placed particular weight on the Supreme
Court’s Diehr decision, given that it was the last time the Court
addressed the issue, and contrasted that case with the ones that
preceded it.184 He concluded that processes must be denied patent-
ability when granting the relevant claims would preempt all uses of
the algorithms contained therein.185 Noting the innate difficulty of
applying this principle, the court found relief in Supreme Court
precedent, which the court construed as enunciating a specific
standard, observing that a “claimed process is surely patent-eligible
under § 101 if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or
(2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or
thing.”186
It is far from clear, however, that Supreme Court precedent
compelled such a conclusion.187 A close reading of Benson, Flook, and
179. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 949, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom.
Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 950.
182. Id. at 952.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 952-66.
185. Id. at 965-66.
186. Id. at 954.
187. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972) (“It is argued that a process
patent must either be tied to a particular machine or apparatus or must operate to change
articles or materials to a ‘different state or thing.’ We do not hold that no process patent could
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Diehr reveals that the Court was careful to emphasize that a
“machine-or-transformation” standard was sufficient, but not nec-
essary, for a process to be patentable—a fact pointed out by Judge
Newman in dissent.188 To this charge, the majority merely cited the
Court’s proclamation in Benson that “[t]ransformation and reduc-
tion of an article to a different state or thing is the clue to the
patentability of a process claim that does not include particular
machines”189—hardly a resounding endorsement of the machine-or-
transformation test’s exclusive force.
While the majority focused on giving Supreme Court precedent a
narrow and artificial reading, the dissenting judges busied them-
selves with arguing that business methods do not fall within the
realm of technological or scientific progress that the patent laws
were meant to protect,190 pointing out the majority’s misreading of
precedent,191 disagreeing with any test that departs from the simple
prohibition on abstract ideas,192 and challenging the legislative
history relied upon by the concurrence,193 respectively.
Only Judge Mayer, in dissent, considered the issue focused upon
by this Article, which is the fundamental principle at the heart of
the patent system.194 As explained supra, self-realizing inventions
of the type giving rise to self-consumption have a weak claim to
patent eligibility.195 This effect is magnified in the context of new
and useful business methods, given the relatively limited fixed
capital devoted to their creation, the absence of any need to
commercialize such methods, and most importantly, the processes’
typically hidden character.196 As many methods of conducting
business may be protected as trade secrets, an inventor will often
ever qualify if it did not meet the requirements of our prior precedents. It is said that the
decision precludes a patent for any program servicing a computer. We do not so hold.”)
(emphases added).
188. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 976-85 (Newman, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 955-56 (majority opinion) (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 70) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
190. Id. at 998 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 976 (Newman, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 1011 (Rader, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 985-90 (Newman, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 1005-06 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
195. See supra Part I.C.
196. See supra Part I.C.3.
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patent such processes only to inflict costs on his competitors. Judge
Mayer briefly considered some of these factors, which the majority
ignored. In particular, he noted that “[b]usiness innovations, by
their very nature, provide a competitive advantage and thus gen-
erate their own incentives.”197 He further commented:
Business method patents, unlike those granted for pharma-
ceuticals and other products, offer rewards that are grossly
disproportionate to the costs of innovation. In contrast to
technological endeavors, business innovations frequently involve
little or no investment in research and development. Bilski, for
example, likely spent only nominal sums to develop his hedging
method. The reward he could reap if his application were
allowed ... vastly exceeds any costs he might have incurred in
devising his “invention.”198
This limited reference to the utilitarian foundation of patent law is
unique among the opinions articulated by the Federal Circuit judges
in Bilski. Even with respect to Judge Mayer’s capable dissent, the
argument appears ancillary when read within the context of the
opinion as a whole. Moreover, it omits reference to the nefarious
inference that can be read into a company’s decision to patent an
internal business method, like the one in Bilski, which would seem
better served by trade secret protection.
4. Bilski’s Legacy
Although the new rule in Bilski will operate to exclude many
kinds of business methods—a positive result given that these
methods generally tend to be self-realizing and adequately
protectable under trade secret law—Bilski’s reasoning is suspect. As
noted, Judge Newman’s dissent demonstrated the frailty of the
Federal Circuit’s opinion and the strained reading it gave binding
Supreme Court precedent.199 And the judiciary’s persisting obsession
with abstraction—as difficult as that concept is to square with
197. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1005 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 1006.
199. Id. at 977-85 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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underlying theory and as onerous as it is to apply in practice200—led
the Bilski court astray. Even if one accepts the normative legitimacy
of the exclusion of abstract ideas and laws of nature, the patentable
subject matter inquiry should not be coterminous with that concern.
All of the judges in Bilski, save Judge Mayer, are guilty of such
myopia. Even Judge Newman, in an otherwise convincing dissent,
viewed the relevant inquiry as being whether a process or product
is useful, novel, and nonobvious, and overlooked the one factor that
should have been of primary concern—namely, whether that
product or process would have materialized in the absence of patent
protection.201
Bilski also raised a number of ancillary questions. The ostensibly
simple requirement that a process, in order to be patentable, be tied
to a particular machine or apparatus or transform an article into a
different state or thing,202 implicates several difficult issues for
application. For instance, it is clear that a mere field of use
requirement or use of a machine for “insignificant extra-solution
activity” will not suffice.203 But what of borderline cases? Will the
use of a general purpose computer suffice? It remains unclear.204
200. See, e.g., Richard S. Gruner, In Search of the Undiscovered Country: The Challenge of
Describing Patentable Subject Matter, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 395, 400
(2007) (“Much of the current uncertainty in the law of patentable subject matter stems from
the failure of the Supreme Court to articulate clear principles for separating patentable
applications from unpatentable abstract ideas.”).
201. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 991-92 (Newman, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 954 (majority opinion).
203. Id. at 957.
204. Even though the Federal Circuit issued its seminal decision in Bilski in late 2008,
there have already been a number of decisions that have applied the new standard. See In re
Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Ex parte Motoyama, Appeal No. 2008-2753,
2009 WL 524946, at *2 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 27, 2009).
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What is clear is that by granting certiorari,205 the Supreme Court
appears ready to confront the debacle that has been the patentable
subject matter inquiry. In doing so, the Court should pay heed to the
issue of “self-realizing” innovation and exclude internal business
methods (like the one in Bilski) and other categories of self-con-
sumed inventions that one can reliably expect to materialize even
in the absence of patent protection. As discussed below, this would
be an important step toward an “incentive to invent” theory of
patentable subject matter and would help return patent law to its
utilitarian roots.
B. Toward an “Incentive To Invent” Theory of Patentable Subject
Matter
It is clear that inventors invent for all sorts of reasons, and IP is
often not one of them.206 This observation carries with it an impor-
tant corollary: patent protection is sometimes unnecessary to spur
innovation, and when it is unnecessary, society should not pay for
its costs. In short, patent protection should not be available for
categories of inventions in which an independent incentive to invent
exists outside of the patent system (such as for internal business
processes).
205. The questions presented to the Court in Bilski are:
a) Whether the Federal Circuit erred by holding that a “process” must be tied to
a particular machine or apparatus, or transform a particular article into a
different state or thing (“machine-or-transformation” test), to be eligible for
patenting under 35 U.S.C. § 101, despite this Court’s precedent declining to limit
the broad statutory grant of patent eligibility for “any” new and useful process
beyond excluding patents for “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract
ideas.”
b) Whether the Federal Circuit’s “machine-or-transformation” test for patent
eligibility, which effectively forecloses meaningful patent protection to many
business methods, contradicts the clear Congressional intent that patents
protect “method[s] of doing or conducting business.” 35 U.S.C. § 273.
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc),
cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009). 
Section 273, which was passed after State Street Bank was decided, limits the scope of
business method patents by providing an affirmative defense to a business method patent
infringement claim. See 35 U.S.C. § 273(a)(1) (2006). It defines “method” as “method of doing
or conducting business” solely for purposes of that section. Id. § 273(a)(3).
206. See supra Part I. 
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To accept this Article’s “incentive to invent” theory of patentable
subject matter, however, we must tackle possible objections. In
particular, unequivocal statutory language provides that patent
protection is to be forthcoming for “any new and useful process.”207
Nowhere does the Patent Act directly state that new and useful
processes should be denied patentability, irrespective of their great
value and nonobviousness, because they would likely have been
inevitable. And the Supreme Court has emphasized that “courts
should not read into the patent laws limitations and conditions
which the legislature has not expressed.”208 The Court has also
counseled: “The subject-matter provisions of the patent law have
been cast in broad terms to fulfill the constitutional and statutory
goal of promoting ‘the Progress of Science and the useful Arts’ with
all that means for the social and economic benefits envisioned by
[Thomas] Jefferson.”209 Thus, the Supreme Court would appear to
be in favor of minimizing Type I errors by erring on the side of over-
inclusion (that is, allowing some undeserving inventions to be
patented). Indeed, the problem of false positives is an important
one: given the vastly beneficial role played by innovation in the
modern economy, the mistaken evisceration of incentives to invent
in particular industries and sciences could be seriously harmful.210
Still, this legitimate concern does not mean that the patentable
subject matter inquiry should be edentulous. As a general matter,
internal business processes that result from free market competition
have scant utilitarian claim to patent protection. Where such
methods are not self-revealing, the basis for an inventor’s decision
to patent them emanates primarily from a desire to inflict harm
on rivals. Although such an inventor may also wish to reap the
pecuniary rewards that flow from exclusive ownership, that return
is a windfall. Advantages in the form of lower costs and higher
consumer demand create a sufficient incentive to invent in the
context of a competitive market.
207. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (emphasis added).
208. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. 303, 308 (1980)).
209. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 315 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).
210. See Barnett, supra note 66, at 859-61 (explaining that the dynamic efficiency
facilitated by IP is likely to exceed the static efficiency associated with weak IP).
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The relevant question, therefore, is whether the exclusion of
certain inevitable inventions can be reconciled with the statutory
text. There is little question that it can. The above-cited passage
from the Supreme Court’s decision in Chakrabarty explains that the
specific provisions of the Patent Act have been crafted pursuant to
the constitutional demand that the development of science and
technology be incentivized. Although § 101 of the Patent Act, the
provision that deals with the patentability of inventions, mentions
no restriction on the right to patent new and useful processes or
products, such a reading emanates from a broader construction of
the statute, and more fundamentally, from the U.S. Constitution
itself. As explored above, there is nearly universal agreement that
the patent system’s foundation is utilitarian and that the patent
rules crafted give force to that goal.211 In short, patent law operates
as a solution to a public goods dilemma.212 No specific rule in the
Patent Act operates in diametric opposition to that goal. So
informed, it follows that § 101’s allowance of “any new and useful”
process can reasonably be construed as “any new and useful”
process that would not be invented and developed absent patent
protection.
This ought not to be controversial. In fact, a literal reading of
§ 101’s requirement would invalidate the Supreme Court’s longest-
held and most fundamental principles of patent law—in particular,
the prohibition on abstract ideas, mathematical principles, laws
of nature, and preexisting phenomena.213 The discovery of such
matters may be of immense value and entirely novel from the per-
spective of the prior art, and would seem worthy of protection from
a literal reading of § 101. Such has obviously not been the case,
however, which would seem to imply at the very least that this
section is not meant to be read in isolation.214
211. See Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 1, at 993-94. The Supreme Court
has recognized the patent system’s utilitarian foundation, and emphasized that the economic
view of patents extends all the way back to the first administrator of the U.S. patent
system—Thomas Jefferson. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1966) (noting that
Thomas Jefferson “rejected a natural-rights theory in intellectual property rights” and
recognized that the patent monopoly “was a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new
knowledge”).
212. See Lemley, Economics of Improvement, supra note 1, at 993-99.
213. See supra Part II.A.1.
214. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (“This Court has undoubtedly recognized
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CONCLUSION: CRACKS IN THE FOUNDATION OF PATENT LAW
The U.S. Constitution, Supreme Court, and legal academy
uniformly state that the patent system is utilitarian in design and
purpose.215 A host of legal rules pay homage to this economic raison
d’être and further patent law’s utilitarian design accordingly.216
Yet contemporary developments in the law have revealed a star-
tling disconnect between theory conceived and theory applied. In
particular, no system premised on utilitarian principles would
create property rights in “self-realizing” inventions. Such innovation
occurs without regard to the prospect of exclusivity, with the result
that patent protection serves only to diminish aggregate welfare.
The principal tool employed by the patent system to exclude such
inevitable innovation is also the law’s greatest impediment to
patentability—the nonobviousness condition.217 This requirement
prevents inventions that entail a de minimis advancement over
the prior art from receiving patent protection. Given self-realizing
innovation’s close relationship to then-existing technological know-
ledge, such scientific advancement is literally “inevitable,” at least
insofar as it is valuable.
But the nonobviousness condition fails to exclude another class
of self-realizing innovation—namely, nonobvious technological dis-
covery that occurs pursuant to incentive structures other than those
created by the patent system. The law’s present failure to exclude
such innovation or even recognize this issue represents a glaring
oversight.
We have demonstrated that a host of innovative technology in the
“useful arts” is likely inspired by rewards other than those provided
by patent law.218 Overriding social norms that reward innovation
through prestige and related factors may provide certain individuals
with sufficient incentives to innovate and commercialize certain in-
ventions. Similarly, “eureka” discoveries arrived at through ad hoc
limits to § 101 and every discovery is not embraced within the statutory terms.”).
215. See supra Part II.
216. See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 294-333 (2003) (discussing the economics of patent law).
217. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
218. See supra Part I.C.
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realization rather than the devotion of ex ante efforts could con-
ceivably be inevitable and therefore unworthy of patent protection.
In addition, some inventors may derive sufficient pleasure from
their inventive activities to continue even in the absence of pecuni-
ary reward.
From a theoretical perspective, such “inevitable” innovation is
unworthy of patent protection under any sensible application of the
law’s underlying utilitarian philosophy. Awarding exclusive rights
in such inventions only creates a social cost—one that rises in direct
proportion to the value of the innovation involved—without an off-
setting benefit. If we could categorically define classes of discoveries
that would not require patent law as a motivating force, then there
would be a strong normative ground for excluding them.
Unfortunately, various pragmatic concerns require the system to
tolerate the patenting of certain self-realizing inventions. Different
inventors are motivated in highly distinct and idiosyncratic ways,
so although altruism might spur one person to innovate, and social
recognition (such as academic status or broader community repu-
tation) might motivate another, a third person might be unmoved
by these rewards. And given the difficulty of separating inventors
according to their motives, any attempt to categorically exclude
“eureka” discoveries or those achieved pursuant to broader social
norms would be difficult if not impossible to accomplish. Thus, there
is reason to believe that denying exclusive rights for such inven-
tions would negatively impact innovation. Because innovation
and dynamic efficiency yield the greatest benefits to the modern
economy,219 society must not inadvertently stifle that source of social
wealth through myopic and ill-considered restrictions in patent
rights.220 As a result, overinclusion of some self-realizing innovation
might be necessary to preserve a vibrant patent system.
Self-consumed inventions represent a dramatic exception to this
somewhat melancholy conclusion. Commercial innovation that
reduces costs or increases consumer demand will likely be self-
realizing, given the advantages these innovations provide in a
competitive environment.221 Unlike other classes of inevitable
219. See Barnett, supra note 66, at 859-61.
220. Id.
221. Accord Developments in the Law—Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REV. 932, 939 (1964)
([The] “law of trade secrets permits innovators to develop new products for market without
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discovery, certain self-consumed inventions—paradigmatically,
internal business methods—would be created even if the patent
system did not exist. This Article concludes that such methods have
an attenuated claim to the benefits of IP.222
But how to exclude this form of innovation? As we have seen,
the nonobviousness condition is ineffective for this purpose, so we
must look elsewhere. The answer lies in the threshold inquiry of
patentable subject matter—an inquiry that courts and scholars have
thus far only tangentially tied to utilitarian concerns. By categori-
cally denying patent protection to internal business methods—even
if they are novel, useful, and nonobvious—the law can begin to
reconcile the patent system with its utilitarian roots.
The Supreme Court now has a chance to do this in Bilski, as it
revisits the patentable subject matter inquiry for the first time in
nearly three decades. The Court should not adopt the Federal
Circuit’s “machine-or-transformation” test, which mischaracterizes
prior Supreme Court precedent, awkwardly reflects the judiciary’s
aversion to abstraction, and raises as many questions as it answers.
Rather, the Court should refocus the patentable subject matter
inquiry on the incentives to invent and commercialize that have
animated the patent system from its inception. As this Article
explains, these principles require that internal business methods,
such as the one in Bilski, be categorically denied patent protection.
Such a rule would help reconcile the patentable subject matter
inquiry with its utilitarian foundation. It is time to give force to that
foundation, and put primacy of place on incentives.
disclosure to competitors. The initial lead which this protection affords may furnish sufficient
competitive advantage to assure a reward for innovation.”).
222. Cf. Matthew G. Wells, Internet Method Business Patent Policy, 87 VA. L. REV. 729, 770-
76 (2001) (analyzing the effects of market failure on internet business methods and the
economic impact of patent protection).

